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IMPROVING PREDICTABILITY AND CONSISTENCY IN
CLASS ACTION TOLLING
Tanya Pierce*
INTRODUCTION
Class action tolling means that when parties in a suit allege federal
class treatment, the individual claims of putative class members are tolled
in all federal courts while the class action is pending.' Commonly referred
to as American Pipe tolling, this rule prevents duplicative litigation that
would result if plaintiffs were required to intervene or file independent law-
suits to protect their interests while the class action was pending.2 Federal
courts have long settled the application of American Pipe tolling in scenari-
os involving later-filed individual actions? In other scenarios, however, the
application of American Pipe tolling has caused considerable uncertainty.'
This Article examines the difficulties caused by conflicting rules in one of
Associate Professor, Texas A&M University School of Law. J.D. 1996, University of Texas
School of Law; B.A. 1993, University of Texas at Arlington. Many thanks to the participants in the
Central States Law Schools Association Scholarship Conference, the Arizona State University Legal
Scholars Conference, the Southeastern Association of Law Schools New Scholars Program, and the
Texas A&M University School of Law Faculty Colloquia Series for providing feedback on many of the
issues addressed in this article. In particular, I owe special thanks to, Brendan Maher, Luke Meier,
Theodore Rave, Cassandra Robertson, and Howard Wasserman for thoughtful comments on earlier
drafts of this article; to Katherine Price for her research assistance; and to Aric Short for endless support.
1 Crown, Cork & Seal Co. v. Parker, 462 U.S. 345, 354 (1983) (extending American Pipe tolling
to putative class members' later-filed individual actions); Am. Pipe & Constr. Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S.
538, 554 (1974) (holding that attempted intervenors' claims were not time-barred).
2 Crown, Cork & Seal Co., 462 U.S. at 351; Am. Pipe, 414 U.S. at 554.
3 See Crown, Cork & Seal Co., 462 U.S. at 353-54; Am. Pipe, 414 U.S. at 551-52.
4 See, e.g., Stevens v. Novartis Pharm. Corp., 247 P.3d 244, 252 (Mont. 2010) (opining, in dicta,
that an open question exists as to whether some class actions, like those involving mass torts or securi-
ties, should be treated differently for tolling purposes); Jeremy T. Grabill, The Pesky Persistence of
Class Action Tolling in Mass Tort Multidistrict Litigation, 74 LA. L. REV. 433, 442 (2014); Rhonda
Wasserman, Tolling: The American Pipe Tolling Rule and Successive Class Actions, 58 FLA. L. REV.
803, 858 (2006) (analyzing underlying policies and concluding successive class action tolling should be
allowed in certain instances, such as where certification is denied due to a class representative problem
and where certification is denied due to a problem with the class that can be remedied in the successive
class action); Caleb Brown, Note, Piped In: The Tenth Circuit Weighs in on Extending American Pipe
Tolling in State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Boellstorff, 62 OKLA. L. REV. 793, 794, 800-
04 (2010) (comparing decisions that hold tolling should not apply when class members file individual
lawsuits before the certification decision is reached with those that allow such tolling); see also discus-
sion infra Parts I and Ill.
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those scenarios, successive class action tolling,' and suggests how courts in
a related scenario, cross-jurisdictional tolling,' may learn from those diffi-
culties.
In successive class action cases, circuit courts have long applied con-
flicting tolling rules in incompatible ways.' The subclass actions filed in the
wake of Wal-Mart Stores v. Dukes' dramatically illustrate the unfairness
and inefficiencies that can result. There, six years after the nationwide class
certification, the Supreme Court changed Rule 23's commonality standard
and decertified the class for lack of commonality.' Scrambling to correct
this deficiency, some plaintiffs sought leave to amend the original class
allegations, and other plaintiffs filed four smaller subclass actions around
the country.'o Before those subclass actions could proceed, however, courts
had to find the class claims timely. But some circuit courts categorically
refuse to permit tolling in subsequent class actions." Others allow succes-
sive class action tolling in limited situations, such as when the court in the
earlier alleged class action had not reached the certification decision 2 or
when the earlier certification attempt failed based on a problem unrelated to
the ability of the action itself to qualify for class action treatment." Still
others allow successive class action tolling whenever individual tolling
5 Courts use various terms to refer to later-filed class actions. Compare, e.g., Ewing Indus. Corp.
v. Bob Wines Nursery, Inc., 795 F.3d 1324, 1326 (1 lth Cir. 2015) (referring to "the 'piggybacking' of
class actions"), and Griffin v. Singletary, 17 F.3d 356, 359 (1lth Cir. 1994) (explaining the non-
piggyback rule for class actions), with Phipps v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 792 F.3d 637, 642 (6th Cir.
2015) (referring to a "follow-on class action"). For consistency, this article refers to attempts to toll
limitations for a purported class action that is filed after an earlier class action has failed as "successive
class action tolling," borrowing from Professor Wasserman's reference to these later alleged class ac-
tions as "successive class actions." Wasserman, supra note 4, at 806.
6 Cross-jurisdictional tolling involves whether a class action filed in one jurisdiction can save
limitations for actions later filed in a different jurisdiction. Stevens, 247 P.3d at 252. This article's intro-
duction to cross-jurisdictional tolling is meant merely to begin a conversation about the complex issues
surrounding cross-jurisdictional tolling and set the stage for an in-depth analysis of those issues, which
is the subject of a future article.
7 See discussion infra Part I.
131 S. Ct. 2541 (2011).
9 Id. at 2556-57.
10 See discussion infra Part II.
11 See, e.g., Ewing Indus. Corp. v. Bob Wines Nursery, Inc., 795 F.3d 1324, 1326-28 (1lth Cir.
2015) (quoting Griffin v. Singletary, 17 F.3d 356, 359 (11th Cir. 1994)).
12 See, e.g., In re Vertrue Inc. Mktg. & Sales Practices Litig., 719 F.3d 474, 479-80 (6th Cir.
2013).
13 See, e.g., Yang v. Odom, 392 F.3d 97, 107 (3d Cir. 2004) (problem with the class representa-
tive); see also Wasserman, supra note 4, at 849-56 (writing at a time when the majority of circuits that
had considered successive class action tolling had rejected it, and arguing courts should allow succes-
sive class action tolling when the prior court did not reach the certification question or when the defi-
ciency was unrelated to the propriety of the alleged class).
2016] PREDICTABILITY AND CONSISTENCY IN CLASS ACTION TOLLING
would have been allowed.1 4 Thus, the courts in the post-Wal-Mart subclass
actions disagreed as to the timeliness of the later-filed subclass actions.
Initially, three district courts held the subclass actions were barred by limi-
tations, and only one district court held a subclass action was timely filed.
Then, because the law is in flux, after several appeals ensued, just one of
the subclass actions was held barred by limitations, and three were deemed
timely filed.
This Article concludes that circuit courts should adopt the approach
that treats determinations regarding whether to toll successive class actions
the same way it treats determinations regarding whether to toll individual
actions. Under this approach, as long as the original class is timely filed, a
successive class will be deemed timely as well. This approach is superior to
the others for several reasons. First, it is most consistent with the policies
underlying the Supreme Court's adoption of class action tolling in Ameri-
can Pipe.'" This approach best furthers the primary concerns of efficiency
and economy of litigation because it is the approach least likely to result in
plaintiffs filing overlapping, protective class actions while the original class
action is pending. Without successive class action tolling, plaintiffs would
be encouraged to file prophylactic class actions to protect their claims just
in case the original class action were not to be certified. Thus, even though
this approach could cause more plaintiffs to file successive class actions
after original class actions failed, this increase would be likely offset by the
fact that fewer plaintiffs would be encouraged to file prophylactic class
actions while the original class actions were pending.
The approach that allows successive class action tolling whenever toll-
ing would be allowed for later-filed individual cases would also increase
some litigation-related efficiencies by encouraging parties to focus on the
viability of an alleged successive class action itself to proceed as a class,
rather than encouraging side litigation regarding whether successive class
action tolling should apply. This approach to successive class action tolling
also provides sufficient notice to defendants because the original class ac-
tion would have put the parties on notice of the substantive claims, as well
as the number and generic identities of the claimants. Indeed, to the extent
an original class action provides notice sufficient to allow tolling for later-
filed individual actions-and American Pipe says it does-the original
class provides the same kind of notice to allow tolling for later-filed class
actions. Finally, this approach is the one most consistent with two recent
Supreme Court cases regarding the application of Rule 23 and the doctrine
of preemption.' 6
14 See, e.g., Phipps v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 792 F.3d 637, 652-53 (6th Cir. 2015); Sawyer v.
Atlas Heating & Sheet Metal Works, Inc., 642 F.3d 560, 564-65 (7th Cir. 2011).
15 See Am. Pipe & Constr. Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538, 554 (1974).
16 See Smith v. Bayer Corp., 131 S. Ct. 2368, 2373 (2011); Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs. v.
Allstate Ins. Co., 130 S. Ct. 1431, 1442-43 (2010) (plurality opinion).
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Part I of this Article discusses the history and policies underlying the
Supreme Court's adoption of the American Pipe tolling rule. Part II analyz-
es the circuit courts' approaches to successive class action tolling through
the lens of the subclass actions that plaintiffs filed in the wake of the Wal-
Mart Stores v. Dukes case. With the analysis of successive class action toll-
ing as a backdrop, Part III of this Article introduces the problem of cross-
jurisdictional tolling, which courts will face with increasing regularity due
to the increased federal jurisdiction over class actions in light of Congress'
passage of the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005" ("CAFA"). This in-
creased federal jurisdiction means parties will often be required to litigate
state-based class actions in federal courts where it has never been more
difficult to certify those actions.'" And because courts often take years to
reach certification decisions, cross-jurisdictional tolling issues will likely
become more prominent as those class certification requests ultimately
fail.19
I. CLASS ACTION TOLLING
The concept of tolling has existed for centuries and is commonly un-
derstood to mean a temporary suspension of the running of a time period.2 0
Over forty years ago in American Pipe & Construction Co. v. Utah,2 ' the
Supreme Court adopted the class action tolling rule, holding that because
the parties in that case alleged class treatment,2 2 the limitations periods for
17 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332(d), 1453, 1711-1715 (2012) (expanding federal jurisdiction significantly in
class action litigation).
18 See discussion infra Part Ill.
19 See discussion infra Part Ill.
20 City of L.A. v. Cty. of Kern, 328 P.3d 56, 59-60 (Cal. 2014) ("Tolling is a centuries-old con-
cept." (citing Raygor v. Regents of Univ. of Minn., 534 U.S. 533, 551 & n.4 (2002) (Stevens, J., dissent-
ing) (characterizing tolling as "ancient" and citing English cases from as early as 1682); Stewart v.
Kahn, 78 U.S. (II Wall.) 493, 503-507 (1871); Hanger v. Abbott, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 532, 539-542
(1868))).
21 414 U.S. 538 (1974).
22 A class action is a suit brought by an individual or group of individuals in which the individual
or group serves as a representative in the lawsuit for other members of the class with similar claims.
FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a). Thus, it is an exception to the general rule that an individual may pursue his or her
own claims in the manner he or she sees fit. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2550
(2011) (quoting Califano v. Yamasaki, 442 U.S. 682, 700-01 (1979)). As such, the federal rules require
plaintiffs seeking class treatment to prove compliance with Rule 23(a)'s prerequisites and with at least
one of Rule 23(b)'s requirements. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a)-(b); Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S.
591, 613-14 (1997). Perhaps it is worth mentioning that it has become "fashionable these days to talk
about the death of class actions." Jay Tidmarsh, Living in CAFA 's World, 32 REV. LITIG. 691, 691 &
n.1, 695 (2013) [hereinafter Tidmarsh, Living in CAFA 's World] (citing Myriam Gilles, Opting Out of
Liability: The Forthcoming, Near-Total Demise of the Modern Class Action, 104 MICH. L. REV. 373,
375 (2005); Myriam Gilles & Gary Friedman, After Class: Aggregate Litigation in the Wake of AT&T
Mobility v. Concepcion, 79 CHI. L. REV. 623, 627 (2012); Melissa Hart, Will Employment Discrimina-
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related individual claims of putative class members who later sought to
intervene were tolled while the class action was pending. There, with days
left to run on the applicable statute of limitations, the state of Utah brought
a federal antitrust suit on its own behalf and on behalf of public bodies,
agencies, and local Utah officials. 2 4 Six months later, the district court de-
nied class certification on Rule 23(a)(1) numerosity grounds.25 At that point,
more than sixty public entities that had been members of the original puta-
tive class filed motions to intervene.2 6
The district court held the attempted interveners' limitations periods
had expired, and the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals agreed.2 ' The Supreme
Court, however, reversed. 28 The Court reasoned that unless the filing of the
class action tolled the individual limitations periods of putative class mem-
bers, absent class members would be induced to intervene in the class ac-
tion to protect their claims just in case their certification requests were de-
nied after their limitations periods had expired.29
Nearly ten years later, in Crown, Cork & Seal Co. v. Parker,30 the Su-
preme Court expanded the American Pipe tolling rule to include limitations
periods for plaintiffs who wished to file separate individual lawsuits rather
than to intervene in an existing action.3 1 The Court reasoned that if plain-
tiffs' later-filed individual actions were not considered timely, many of the
inefficiencies it avoided by adopting the class action tolling rule in Ameri-
can Pipe would again result.3 2 The Court further recognized putative class
lion Class Actions Survive?, 37 AKRON L. REV. 813, 813 (2004)) (concluding nonetheless that such an
assertion "overstate[s] the case"); see also David S. Schwartz, Claim-Suppressing Arbitration: The New
Rules, 87 IND. L.J. 239, 267 (2012). In fact, of personal injury classes, one scholar recently wrote: "[I]t
is essentially unquestionable that personal injury claims can no longer be certified as litigation classes."
Grabill, supra note 4, at 435 & n.3 (differentiating personal injury claims from non-personal injury
claims such as monetary claims relating to consumer fraud or property damage for which class treatment
may be available); see also Georgene Vairo, Is the Class Action Really Dead? Is That Good or Bad for
Class Members?, 64 EMORY L.J. 477, 513 (2014). Nevertheless, cases dealing with smaller value
claims, antitrust issues, securities fraud, and employment disputes continue to qualify for class treat-
ment. See Tidmarsh, Living in CAFA 's World, supra, at 697; see also Robert H. Klonoff, The Decline of
Class Actions, 90 WASH. U. L. REV. 729, 824-27 (2013) (discussing various types of cases in which
class treatment continues to be a viable option); Linda S. Mullenix, Ending Class Actions as We Know
Them: Rethinking the American Class Action, 64 EMORY L. J. 399, 404 (2014) (concluding that Rule 23
class litigation "remains a vital feature of the litigation landscape").
23 Am. Pipe & Constr. Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538, 554 (1974) (holding that attempted intervenors
claims were not time-barred).
24 Id. at 541-43.
25 Id at 542-43.
26 Id. at 543-44.
27 Id at 544.
28 Id at 550-51.
29 Am. Pipe, 414 U.S. at 551.
30 462 U.S. 345 (1983).
31 Id. at 354.
32 Id. at 350.
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members could have reasons after the denial of a certification request to
prefer to bring individual actions rather than to intervene in the ongoing
action.
In adopting class action tolling, the Court in these cases balanced the
policy concerns underlying Rule 23 with those underlying statutes of limita-
tions.34 Regarding Rule 23, the Court identified efficiency and economy of
litigation as the primary motivation underlying both the class action rule
itself and the class action tolling rule. Without tolling, the Court reasoned,
"needless multiplicity of actions" would result, which was "precisely the
situation that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 and the tolling rule of
American Pipe were designed to avoid."36
While neither opinion discussed other Rule 23 concerns, the adoption
of class action tolling clearly implicates those as well." For example, the
availability of class treatment can allow claimants in negative-value class
actions the ability to pursue their claims by spreading the costs of litiga-
tion;38 it can ensure the substantive laws underlying such negative-value
claims are enforced; it can protect defendants from the need to defend mul-
tiple lawsuits that could result in inconsistent judgments; and it can protect
the due process rights of absent class members.39 Indeed, scholars have of-
ten applauded the class action device for not only rendering possible com-
pensation to victims who suffer relatively small injuries from the actions of
a single defendant, but also for potentially holding accountable defendants
who would otherwise not be held accountable 40 and for leveling the playing
3 For example, a plaintiff might conclude that the forum in which a class action were pending
was not a convenient one or that the shared control over a lawsuit might not be desirable once the econ-
omies of proceeding as a class no longer existed. Id
34 Am. Pipe, 414 U.S. at 554.
35 Crown, Cork & Seal Co., 462 U.S. at 350-52; Am. Pipe, 414 U.S. at 550; see also Chardon v.
Fumero Soto, 462 U.S. 650, 659 (1983). Class action tolling employs the classic legal fiction that mem-
bers of a putative class action are considered to be parties to the action just as if they were before the
court themselves, and they remain parties until they choose not to be or until the court denies the class
certification request. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. v. Boellstorff 540 F.3d 1223, 1229 (10th Cir. 2008)
(quoting Am. Pipe, 414 U.S. at 550; In re WorldCom Sec. Litig., 496 F.3d 245, 255 (2d Cir. 2007)).
36 Crown, Cork& Seal Co.,462 U.S. at351.
37 See Wasserman, supra note 4, at 824-25.
38 A "negative value" class action is one in which the value of each individual claim is so insignif-
icant in comparison to the costs of litigating the claim that absent class treatment, a plaintiff would lack
incentive or means to pursue the claim. See 2 WILLIAM B. RUBENSTEIN, NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS
§ 4:87, at 363 & n.3 (5th ed. 2012).
3 Id. §§ 4:66-67.
40 See, e.g., Barry Sullivan & Amy Kobelski Trueblood, Court Rules-Rule 23(): A Note on Law
and Discretion in the Courts of Appeals, 246 F.R.D. 277, 277 (2008) (citing Jonathan M. Landers, Of
Legalized Blackmail and Legalized Theft: Consumer Class Actions and the Substance-Procedure Di-
lemma, 47 S. CAL. L. REV. 842, 857-58, 860 (1974); Michael E. Solimine & Christine Oliver Hines,
Deciding to Decide: Class Action Certification and Interlocutory Review by the United States Courts of
Appeals Under Rule 23(), 41 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1531, 1534 (2000)); see also Klonoff, supra note
344 [VOL. 23:2
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field between the parties.4' In fact, Rule 23 has become a "primary vehicle"
for enforcement in certain areas of law, such as antitrust, securities, and
discrimination laws. 42
In addition to carefully considering the concerns underlying Rule 23 in
both American Pipe and Crown, Cork & Seal Co., the Court considered
whether tolling would be "inconsistent" with the policies underlying stat-
utes of limitations.4 3 In adopting class action tolling, the Court made clear
that it did not consider its decisions to be "breaking new ground."" To illus-
trate, the Court in American Pipe examined other cases in which it had al-
lowed plaintiffs to file suits outside of applicable limitations periods.
Those cases, the Court concluded, supported the long-held conclusion that
federal courts have the power to hold that statutes of limitations are tolled
"under certain circumstances not inconsistent with legislative purposes,"
and the adoption of class action tolling was not inconsistent with the poli-
cies of "repose and certainty inherent" in statutes of limitations.4 6
22, at 815-16 (recognizing class action treatment serves as an important device that allows these claims
to be adjudicated, and both compensates the injured and provides consequences to wrongdoers); Jay
Tidmarsh, Auctioning Class Settlements, 56 WM. & MARY L. REv. 227, 229 (2014) (discussing premises
behind "some radical ideas" in cases and literature regarding class actions, among them, the idea that
"class actions are valuable because they can achieve significant deterrence, especially in small-value
cases for which individual litigation is not an option" (citing Hughes v. Kore of Ind. Enter., 731 F.3d
672, 677 (7th Cir. 2013)).
41 See, e.g., William B. Rubenstein, A Transactional Model ofAdjudication, 89 GEo. L.J. 371, 433
& n.265 (2001) (citing Developments in the Law-The Paths of Civil Litigation, 113 HARv. L. REV.
1752, 1809 (2000); Marc Galanter, Why the "Haves" Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of
Legal Change, 9 LAW & SoC'Y REv. 95, 143 (1974)).
42 2 RUBENSTEIN, supra note 38, § 4:66, at 260. Of course, others have criticized the class action
device as encouraging abuse. For example, a common complaint is that a claimant's incentive to watch
over the class lawyer's conduct is proportional to the size of the claim, and in negative-value class
actions, the claimants' individual claims are not large. See, e.g., Martin H. Redish, Class Actions and the
Democratic Dificulty: Rethinking the Intersection of Private Litigation and Public Goals, 2003 U. CHL
LEGAL F. 71, 78 (criticizing, among other things, the use of Rule 23 to transform underlying substantive
law though the class action is meant to be a purely procedural device). Thus, the argument is that the
smaller the individual claim, the less incentive the claimant has to manage the litigation. Id. at 79. Less
incentive for a client to be involved can then mean more incentive for an unscrupulous lawyer to pursue
the litigation for the lawyer's rather than the client's benefit. See id.
43 Crown, Cork & Seal Co. v. Parker, 462 U.S. 345, 352-54 (1983); Am. Pipe & Constr. Co. v.
Utah, 414 U.S. 538, 554-59 (1974).
44 Am. Pipe, 414 U.S. at 558.
45 Id. at 558-59 (citing Bumett v. New York Cent. R.R., 380 U.S. 424 (1965) (allowing plaintiff
who timely filed Federal Employers' Liability Act claim in state court to file new action in federal court
outside the statutory, three-year time frame); Glus v. Brooklyn E. Dist. Terminal, 359 U.S. 231 (1959)
(allowing suit commencement after statutory time frame when the defendant induced the delay);
Holmberg v. Armbrecht, 327 U.S. 392 (1946) (allowing suit commencement after statutory time frame
when fraudulent concealment caused the delay)).
46 Am. Pipe, 414 U.S. at 558-59.
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In both American Pipe and Crown, Cork & Seal Co., the Court rea-
soned that class action tolling was consistent with the limitations' policies
of providing notice, avoiding unfair surprise, and preventing plaintiffs from
sleeping on their rights.47 When plaintiffs filed purported class actions, the
alleged class actions would put defendants on notice of the substantive
claims, as well as the number and general identities of the individuals likely
to have those claims and alert defendants that they must preserve all evi-
dence related to the asserted claims.48 And because tolling would apply only
to those claims for which the original class action reasonably put the de-
fendant on notice,49 class action tolling also would be consistent with the
policy of promoting justice and preventing unfair "surprises through the
revival of claims that have been allowed to slumber until evidence has been
lost, memories have faded, and witnesses have disappeared."" Therefore,
the Court reasoned that, like Rule 23, statutes of limitations are also meant
to promote judicial efficiency." In the absence of class action tolling, that
goal would be frustrated.5 2
Of the class action tolling rule, however, courts and commentators
alike also have noted frequently that the American Pipe tolling rule "'is a
generous one, inviting abuse.""' And lawyers should not treat the rule as
encouragement to frame their pleadings as class actions in attempts to at-
tract plaintiffs, to save members of purported class actions when those
members have slept on their rights, or to try to raise claims not covered by
the original class action.54
47 Crown, Cork & Seal Co., 462 U.S. at 352-54 (citing Del. State Coll. v. Ricks, 449 U.S. 250,
256-57 (1980); Burnett, 380 U.S. at 428); Am. Pipe, 414 U.S. at 554-55. For a more in-depth discussion
of the policies underlying statutes of limitations, see Wasserman, supra note 4, at 810-13.
48 Crown, Cork & Seal Co., 462 U.S. at 352-54; Am. Pipe, 414 U.S. at 554-55.
49 Crown, Cork & Seal Co., 462 U.S. at 355 (Powell, J., concurring) ("Claims as to which the
defendant was not fairly placed on notice by the class suit are not protected under American Pipe and
are barred by the statute of limitations.").
50 Order of R.R. Telegraphers v. Ry. Express Agency, Inc., 321 U.S. 342, 348-49 (1944).
51 See Crown, Cork & Seal Co., 462 U.S. at 353; Am. Pipe, 414 U.S. at 554-56.
52 See Crown, Cork & Seal Co., 462 U.S. at 353; Am. Pipe, 414 U.S. at 554-56.
53 See, e.g., Albano v. Shea Homes Ltd. P'ship, 634 F.3d 524, 529 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting
Crown, Cork & Seal Co., 462 U.S. at 354 (Powell, J., concurring)); Weston v. AmeriBank, 265 F.3d
366, 368 (6th Cir. 2001) (citing Crown, Cork & Seal Co., 462 U.S. at 354 (Powell, J., concurring));
Sellers v. Bragg, No. 04 C 3663, 2005 WL 1667406, at *6 (N.D. Ill. July 13, 2005) (quoting Crown,
Cork & Seal Co., 462 U.S. at 354 (Powell, J., concurring)); Wasserman, supra note 4, at 843-44 (noting
that the First and Fifth Circuits also share Justice Powell's concern).
54 Crown, Cork & Seal Co., 462 U.S. at 355 (Powell, J., concurring) (quoting Am. Pipe, 414 U.S.
at 562 (Blackmun, J., concurring)).
346 [VOt. 23:2
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II. SUCCESSIVE CLASS ACTION TOLLING
The typical application of American Pipe tolling covers only plaintiffs'
later attempts to intervene or to file individual claims in federal courts after
an earlier alleged class action fails." While this application of American
Pipe tolling is well settled," federal circuit courts are split as to whether
class action tolling should apply to later-filed class actions in their courts,
and they have articulated conflicting approaches to answering this ques-
tion." Successive class action tolling issues can arise in several scenarios.
These scenarios can be grouped into those cases in which courts did not
reach a certification decision and those in which earlier courts denied certi-
fication." In addition, where earlier courts denied certification, those cases
can be grouped into cases in which certification failed due to a deficiency
that could be addressed by a successive class action and those in which
certification failed due to the class's inability to qualify for class treat-
ment." Some circuits refuse to apply American Pipe tolling to later-filed
class actions no matter what happened in the earlier alleged class action.6 0
Other circuits apply American Pipe tolling to later-filed class actions only
in limited situations depending on what happened in the earlier alleged
class action.' Still others conclude class action tolling always applies to
later-filed class actions the same way it applies to later-filed individual ac-
tions.62
The subclass actions filed in the wake of the Supreme Court's decision
in Wal-Mart Stores v. Dukes dramatically illustrate the unfairness and inef-
ficiencies the circuit courts' conflicting approaches to successive class ac-
tion tolling can have. An analysis of the various approaches to successive
class action tolling, the conflicting decisions reached in the post-Wal-Mart
successive subclass actions, and the Supreme Courts' decisions in Shady
Grove and Bayer suggest courts should treat successive class action tolling
just as they treat tolling in the typical scenario involving later-filed individ-
ual actions. As explained below, the resulting benefits in terms of increased
55 Wasserman, supra note 4, at 805-07.
56 Crown, Cork & Seal Co., 462 U.S. at 354; Am. Pipe, 414 U.S. at 547-51.
57 Compare Sawyer v. Atlas Heating & Sheet Metal Works, Inc., 642 F.3d 560, 563-64 (7th Cir.
2011) (finding that the question involves a false conflict since preclusion is the real issue and remanding
for an initial certification determination), and Phipps v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 792 F.3d 637, 649 (6th
Cir. 2015) (holding that a subsequent class action is not time barred if the district court has not previous-
ly denied class certification), with Ewing Indus. Corp. v. Bob Wines Nursery, Inc., 795 F.3d 1324, 1328
(11th Cir. 2015) (holding that subsequent class action suits are time barred to avoid "endless rounds of
litigation" (quoting Griflin v. Singletary, 17 F.3d 356, 358 (11th Cir. 1994))).
58 See discussion infra Section II.C.
59 See discussion infra Section II.C.
60 See, e.g., Ewing Indus. Corp., 795 F.3d at 1327-28.
61 See, e.g., Yang v. Odom, 392 F.3d 97, 99 (3d Cir. 2004).
62 See, e.g., Phipps, 792 F.3d at 652; Sawyer, 642 F.3d at 564.
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predictability, consistency, and efficiency outweigh the risks, which are
quite similar in any event to those involved in the application of American
Pipe tolling in the typical scenario.
A. Wal-Mart Stores Initial Class Action
In Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, a full decade after the plaintiffs first
filed suit, the Supreme Court decertified the nationwide class." Plaintiffs
alleged that Wal-Mart had discriminated against them on the basis of their
sex in violation of Title VII.' As a result, the plaintiffs sought class treat-
ment of their claims for injunctive relief, declaratory relief, and back pay.65
In 2004, a California district court certified a nationwide class of plain-
tiffs.66 Nearly six years later, after several related hearings and re-hearings,
in a divided en bane opinion, the Ninth Circuit largely upheld the nation-
wide class certification.6" In March 2011, however, a divided Supreme
Court decertified the nationwide class.
The majority characterized the Wal-Mart case as "one of the most ex-
pansive class actions ever. "69 The putative class consisted of 1.5 million
current or former employees of the approximately 3,400 Wal-Mart stores
nationally." Wal-Mart divided its stores among forty-one geographic re-
gions around the country, and each region contained approximately eighty
to eighty-five stores." Emphasizing the size and scope of the alleged class,
the dissimilarities between the putative class members, and the lack of evi-
dence regarding a company-wide discriminatory policy, the majority held
that the alleged nationwide class failed to meet Rule 23(a)'s commonality
63 Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2557 (2011).
6 Id. at 2547.
65 Id.
66 Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 222 F.R.D. 137, 187-88 (N.D. Cal. 2004), aff'd in part, 603
F.3d 571, 616, 625 (9th Cir. 2010) (en banc), rev'd, 131 S. Ct. 2541 (2011).
67 Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 131 S. Ct. at 2549. The Ninth Circuit upheld class certification except as
to inclusion of punitive damages claims, and opined that putative members who were not Wal-Mart
employees at the time that the complaint was filed lacked standing to seek injunctive or declaratory
relief. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 603 F.3d at 616, 625.
68 Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 131 S. Ct. at 2561. Justice Antonin Scalia wrote the opinion for the
Court. Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, Sotomayer, and Kagan concurred in part and dissented in part. They
agreed that the class should not have been certified under Rule 23(b)(2), but disagreed with the Court's
conclusion that the plaintiffs could not satisfy the "commonality" requirement in Rule 23(a). Id at 2561,
2565 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). They would have remanded the case for
consideration of whether the class the plaintiffs described may be certified as a class pursuant to Rule
23(b)(3). Id. at 2561-62.
69 Id. at 2547 (majority opinion).
70 Id.
71 Id
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requirement.7 2 To meet the commonality requirement, the majority stated
plaintiffs must have shown significant proof of a general policy of discrim-
ination at Wal-Mart, which they failed to do because they did not show that
the Title VII claims of all putative class members would depend on answers
to common questions." Thus, the class failed for lack of commonality."
The decision suggested, however, that plaintiffs conceivably could sat-
isfy the commonality requirement if the plaintiffs could prove that an em-
ployer operated under a general policy of discrimination that manifested
itself in hiring and promotion practices in the same general fashion." Like-
wise, in an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, Justice Ruth
Bader Ginsburg opined that a "putative class of this type may be certifiable
under Rule 23(b)(3), if the plaintiffs show that common class questions
'predominate' over issues affecting individuals . . . and that a class action is
'superior' to other modes of adjudication." 6 Observing that the question of
whether the class plaintiffs met the specific requirements of Rule 23(b)(3)
was not before the Court, however, Justice Ginsburg stated that she would
reserve that issue for consideration on remand."
After the Court decertified the nationwide class, the plaintiffs scram-
bled to try to save their claims. As one district court aptly noted, the plain-
tiffs could hardly "be faulted for failing to anticipate a significant develop-
ment in the Supreme Court's class-action jurisprudence." Indeed, the case
appears to have "given new meaning to commonality," which had previous-
ly been "rarely an impediment to class certification."" Limitations periods
for plaintiffs' individual actions were clearly subject to American Pipe toll-
ing. But, unsurprisingly, several groups of plaintiffs also sought to save
their class claims by attempting to cure the commonality defects the Su-
preme Court identified. Thus, the original plaintiffs moved to amend the
class allegations,o and a several groups of plaintiffs filed narrower subclass
actions around the country." District courts, therefore, had to decide wheth-
72 Id. at 2554-55.
73 Id. at 2554-57.
74 Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 131 S. Ct. at 2557.
75 Id. at 2553 (quoting Gen. Tel. Co. of Sw. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 159 n.15 (1982)).
76 Id. at 2561 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
77 id.
78 Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., No. C 01-02252 CRB, 2012 WL 4329009, at *3 (N.D. Cal.
Sept. 21, 2012); see also Ladik v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 291 F.R.D. 263, 264-65 (W.D. Wis. 2013)
(concluding that although American Pipe tolled plaintiffs' subsequent class action, the narrowed class
still failed for lack of Rule 23 commonality and lamenting that "even the most serious problems cannot
always be resolved by a class action lawsuit").
79 Klonoff, supra note 22, at 773-74; see also A. Benjamin Spencer, Class Actions, Heightened
Commonality, and Declining Access to Justice, 93 B.U. L. REv. 441, 443 (2013).
80 Dukes, 2012 WL4329009, at *1.
81 Love v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., No. 12-61959-Civ, 2013 WL 5434565, at *1 (S.D. Fla. dis-
missed Sept. 23, 2013); Ladik v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 291 F.R.D. 263, 264 (W.D. Wis. 2013); Phipps
v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 925 F. Supp. 2d 875, 905 (M.D. Tenn. 2013), rev'd, 792 F.3d 634, 645 (6th
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er tolling also applied to save limitations for plaintiffs' successive subclass
actions.
Starting with the original nationwide class, the district court allowed
the amendment but in doing so highlighted the difference between amend-
ing an already existing class action and filing a new class action lawsuit.8 2
The Ninth Circuit, the court emphasized, found it significant when a suc-
cessive class was "not seeking to relitigate any prior adverse decision," and
the district court concluded that the plaintiffs were not seeking to do that
because the newly alleged class claims contained a subset of the claims of
which defendants had notice through the original class action." Thus, the
court reasoned that American Pipe's "goals of avoiding multiplicitous liti-
gation and unfair surprise" would be served by allowing the amendment."
In dicta, however, the court implied that the outcome might be different if
the plaintiffs had sought to file a separate, successive class action rather
than to amend the original class action."
B. Wal-Mart Stores Later Alleged Subclass Actions
Of course, several former class plaintiffs did file separate subclass ac-
tion lawsuits in federal district courts around the country: (1) the Odle case
in Texas; (2) the Love case in Florida; (3) the Phipps case in Tennessee;"
and (4) the Ladik case in Wisconsin." In each of these cases, Wal-Mart
moved to dismiss, arguing, among other things, that the successive class
actions were time-barred." Because of the circuit court split on successive
class action tolling, the district courts reached conflicting conclusions, with
just one concluding that the subclass allegations were timely, and three
Cir. 2015); Odle v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., No. 3:11 -cv-2954-O, 2012 WL 5292957, at *I (N.D. Tex.
Oct. 15, 2012), rev'd, 747 F.3d 315 (5thCir. 2014).
82 Dukes, 2012 WL 4329009, at *7-8. Ultimately, the plaintiffs were unsuccessful in their bid to
have the new class certified, but that failure was not due to limitations.
83 Id.
84 Id. at *8 (citing Wasserman, supra note 4, at 858).
85 id
86 Odle, 2012 WL 5292957, at *1. The Fifth Circuit reversed the trial court's ruling that plaintiffs
individual claims were time barred, but did not consider the propriety of the district court's ruling that
the successive subclass action was time barred because that issue was not before the court. Odle, 747
F.3d at 319 n.20.
87 Love v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., No. 12-61959-Civ, 2013 WL 5434565, at *1 (S.D. Fla. dis-
missed Sept. 23, 2013).
88 Phipps v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 925 F. Supp. 2d 875, 905 (M.D. Tenn. 2013) (holding, reluc-
tantly, that the subclass could not benefit from American Pipe tolling), rev'd, 792 F.3d 637 (6th Cir.
2015).
89 Ladik v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 291 F.R.D. 263, 264 (W.D. Wis. 2013).
90 Love, 2013 WL 5434565, at *1; Ladik, 291 F.R.D. at 264; Phipps, 925 F. Supp. 2d at 875;
Odle, 2012 WL 5292957, at *1.
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concluding that they were time-barred. Appeals were taken in three of the
district court cases, and at the end of the day, in part because the law on
successive class actions is evolving, three were considered timely, and just
one was time-barred.
C. Evolution of Successive Class Action Approaches
Ten years ago, the majority of circuit courts that had considered suc-
cessive class action tolling had rejected it outright." Those courts tended to
use broad, bright-line language that suggested they would never allow such
tolling. Over time, however, many courts, including some that had original-
ly articulated what appeared to be bright-line prohibitions, moved away
from that rigid approach.92 Indeed, a trend has developed in federal courts
of allowing American Pipe tolling to apply to later-filed subclass actions, at
least in some instances." But the law is in flux, and not all circuits agree.'
1. Bright-Line Prohibition Approach
Courts that have articulated a bright-line prohibition have invoked
several policy concerns for doing so." Primarily, they have raised the poli-
cy of repose. If successive class action tolling were allowed, for example,
these courts suggest statutes of limitations could be extended indefinitely,
and the repose promised by statutes of limitations would never be reached."
91 Wasserman, supra note 4, at 842 & n.204 (citing cases in the First, Second, Fifth, Sixth, and
Eleventh Circuits). As discussed later in this Section, several of these circuit courts have since allowed
successive class action tolling in some situations. See discussion infra Part II.C.
92 See, e.g., In re Vertrue Inc. Mktg. & Sales Practices Litig., 719 F.3d 474, 479-80 (6th Cir.
2013); Great Plains Trust Co. v. Union Pac. R.R., 492 F.3d 986, 997 (8th Cir. 2007); Yang v. Odom,
392 F.3d 97, 99 (3d Cir. 2004); Catholic Soc. Servs., Inc. v. INS, 232 F.3d 1139, 1149 (9th Cir. 2000)
(en banc); City Select Auto Sales, Inc. v. David Randall Assocs., No. 11-2658, 2012 WL 426267, at * 3-
4 (D.N.J. Feb. 7, 2012); Hershey v. ExxonMobil Oil Corp., 278 F.R.D. 617, 622 (D. Kan. 2011); Vil-
lanueva v. Davis Bancorp, Inc., No. 09 CV 7826, 2011 WL 2745936, at *4 (N.D. Ill. July 8, 2011);
Gomez v. St. Vincent Health, Inc., 622 F. Supp. 2d 710, 723 (S.D. Ind. 2008).
9 Hershey, 278 F.R.D. at 622.
94 See, e.g., Ewing Indus. Corp. v. Bob Wines Nursery, Inc., 795 F.3d 1324, 1327-28 (11th Cir.
2015) (citing and disagreeing with cases allowing successive class action tolling); Griffin v. Singletary,
17 F.3d 356, 359 (11 th Cir. 1994) (quoting Andrews v. Orr, 851 F.2d 146, 149 (6th Cir. 1988); Salazar-
Calderon v. Presidio Valley Farmers Ass'n, 765 F.2d 1334, 1351 (5th Cir. 1985)); Breaux v. Am. Fami-
ly Mut. Ins. Co., Nos. 04-cv-00191-EWN-MJW, 04-cv-00539-EWN-MJW, 2006 WL 2548260, at *12
(D. Colo. Sept. 1, 2006), aff'd in part, revd in part on other grounds, 554 F.3d 854 (10th Cir. 2009);
Contreras v. Ridge, 305 F. Supp. 2d 126, 134 n.4 (D.D.C. 2004); Vinson v. Seven Seventeen HB Phila.
Corp., No. 2:00-cv-06334, 2001 WL 1774073, at *8 (E.D. Pa. 2001).
95 Wasserman, supra note 4, at 842-43.
96 id
97 id
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Instead, the adoption of successive class action tolling would force defend-
ants to endlessly defend against the same class allegations." One of these
decisions also expressed judicial efficiency concerns, suggesting that allow-
ing successive class action tolling "would consume scarce judicial re-
sources, while a decision declining to toll the statute of limitations in a suc-
cessive class action arguably would conserve them."99 That decision also
suggested that tolling could result in a lack of respect for prior judicial deci-
sions by allowing plaintiffs to "argue and reargue the question of class cer-
tification by filing new but repetitive complaints."'" Indeed, the Eleventh
Circuit recently warned that allowing successive class action tolling could
result in allowing a "purported class almost limitless bites at the [certifica-
tion] apple.""'
Bright-line prohibition cases have tended to include broad and abso-
lute language. For example, one court categorically stated, "the pendency of
a previously filed class action does not toll the limitations period for addi-
tional class actions by putative members of the original asserted class."O2
And another stated, "plaintiffs may not 'piggyback one class action onto
another' and thereby engage in endless rounds of litigation" over the pro-
priety of the prior denial of certification.'03
Three groups of post-Wal-Mart plaintiffs filed successive subclass ac-
tions in Texas, Tennessee, and Florida. These courts are in Fifth, Sixth, and
Eleventh circuits, which at least at the time, appeared to follow bright-line
prohibitions to successive class action tolling." Thus, the district courts
held that plaintiffs' class allegations were barred by limitations.'
98 See, e.g., Ewing Indus. Corp., 795 F.3d at 1328 (citing Griffin, 17 F.3d at 359); Basch v.
Ground Round, Inc., 139 F.3d 6, 10-11 (1st Cir. 1998); see also Wasserman, supra note 4, at 843.
99 Wasserman, supra note 4, at 843 (citing Korwek v. Hunt, 827 F.2d 874, 879 (2d Cir. 1987)).
100 Korwek, 827 F.2d at 879; Wasserman, supra note 4, at 843.
101 Ewing Indus. Corp., 795 F.3d at 1326.
102 Andrews v. Orr, 851 F.2d 146, 149 (6th Cir. 1988). The Sixth Circuit has since moved away
from the bright-line prohibition approach. See Phipps v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 792 F.3d 637, 652 (6th
Cir. 2015); In re Vertrue Inc. Mktg. & Sales Practices Litig., 719 F.3d 474, 479-80 (6th Cir. 2013); see
also discussion infra Parts II.C.2-3.
103 Ewing Indus. Corp., 795 F.3d at 1328 (quoting Griffin, 17 F.3d at 359).
104 See id; Griffin, 17 F.3d at 359; Andrews, 851 F.2d at 149; Salazar-Calderon v. Presidio Valley
Farmers Ass'n, 765 F.2d 1334, 1351 (5th Cir. 1985). The Sixth Circuit has since rejected the bright-line
prohibition. See Phipps, 792 F.3d at 652; In re Vertrue Inc. Mktg. & Sales Practices Litig., 719 F.3d at
479-80.
105 Love v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., No. 12-61959-Civ, 2013 WL 5434565, at *5 (S.D. Fla. dis-
missed Sept. 23, 2013); Phipps v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 925 F. Supp. 2d 875, 905 (M.D. Tenn. 2013),
rev'd, 792 F.3d 637 (6th Cir. 2015); Odle v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., No. 3:11 -cv-2954-O, 2012 WL
5292957, at *10 (N.D. Tex. Oct. 15, 2012), rev'don other grounds, 747 F.3d 315 (5th Cir. 2014). The
Fifth Circuit reversed the district court's ruling that plaintiff Odle's individual claims were time-barred.
Odle, 747 F.3d at 323. In striking examples of the lack of consistency and predictability surrounding
successive class action tolling, as discussed below, since the plaintiffs filed the successive subclass
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In the Odle case filed in Texas, the court agreed with Wal-Mart that
the Fifth Circuit's decision in Salazar-Calderon v. Presidio Valley Farmers
Ass'nl0 6 meant the Fifth Circuit followed a "no piggyback rule," which pro-
hibited the court from applying American Pipe tolling to plaintiffs' later-
filed class action claims.' Similarly, in the Love case filed in Florida, the
district court dismissed as untimely the plaintiffs' successive subclass ac-
tion claims because "[t]he Eleventh Circuit categorically refuses to toll the
limitations period for subsequent class actions by members of the original
class once class certification is denied in the original suit."'08
While the Texas and Florida district courts in the post-Wal-Mart sub-
class actions readily concluded the successive class actions were time-
barred,' 9 the Tennessee district court made clear when it joined them that it
did so reluctantly.' That the court struggled is clear from the fact that the
opinion spans over thirty pages, most of which describe the various reasons
successive class action tolling should apply, before the court concluded the
Sixth Circuit's holding in Andrews v. Orr"' required it to reject plaintiffs'
class action allegations as untimely." 2 In the Andrews case, decided over
twenty-five years earlier, the Sixth Circuit refused to extend the tolling
principle enunciated in American Pipe and Crown, Cork & Seal to the initi-
ation of a new class action."' And it declared the existence of "unanimous
agreement that the pendency of a previously filed class action does not toll
the limitations period for additional class actions by putative members of
the original asserted class."" 4
Fast-forward a quarter of a century, however, and the successive class
action tolling landscape had changed dramatically."' That "unanimous
actions, the Fifth and Sixth circuits have pulled back from the bright-line prohibition, while the Eleventh
Circuit has not.
106 765 F.2d 1334 (5th Cir. 1985).
107 Odle, 2012 WL 5292957, at *5, *7 (citing Salazar-Calderon, 765 F.2d at 1351) (concluding
that the court was bound by Salazar-Calderon); see also Dickson v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 685 F. Supp. 2d
623, 629 (N.D. Tex. 2010).
108 Love, 2013 WL 5434565, at *2, *5 (emphasis added) (citing Grffin, 17 F.3d at 359).
109 Id. at *5; Odle, 2012 WL 5292957, at *9.
110 Phipps v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., No. 3:12-cv-1009, 2013 WL 2897961, at *3 (M.D. Tenn. June
13, 2013) (referring to its decision in Phipps v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 925 F. Supp. 2d 875 (M.D. Tenn.
2013), as one in which it "reluctantly" concluded that the subclass could not benefit from American Pipe
tolling).
Ill 851 F.2d 146 (6th Cir. 1988).
112 Phipps, 925 F. Supp. 2d at 875-906.
113 Andrews, 851 F.2d at 149. At that time, the Sixth Circuit affirmed an earlier Ohio district court,
one much less reluctanct than the later Tennessee district court to find tolling inapplicable to a new class
action. Andrews v. Orr, 614 F. Supp. 689, 694 (D.C. Ohio 1985), affd, 851 F.2d 146 (6th Cir. 1988).
I14 Andrews, 851 F.2d at 149.
115 By this time, many courts had allowed successive class action tolling, at least in some scenari-
os. See, e.g., Sawyer v. Atlas Heating & Sheet Metal Works, Inc., 642 F.3d 560, 564 (7th Cir. 2011);
Great Plains Trust Co. v. Union Pac. R.R., 492 F.3d 986, 997 (8th Cir. 2007); Yang v. Odom, 392 F.3d
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agreement" had evaporated so much that by 2011, the Seventh Circuit,
which follows the opposite approach and allows successive class action
tolling, opined that the circuit court decisions on successive class actions
were not in conflict." 6 But Sixth Circuit law did not evolve quickly enough
for the post-Wal-Mart plaintiffs in Tennessee."'
2. Limited Exceptions Approach
Aside from the Seventh Circuit,"' and more recently the Sixth Cir-
cuit,"' courts that have applied class action tolling to later-filed class ac-
tions have done so only in limited circumstances. The Third,'20 Seventh,
Eighth, 2 ' and Ninth'22 Circuits have all allowed American Pipe tolling to
apply if the prior court did not reach the class certification decision or if the
prior court rejected class certification due to a deficiency unrelated to the
propriety of the proposed class. In addition, while the Second, Third, and
Tenth Circuits have not expressly adopted successive class action tolling,
districts courts in each of these circuits as well as in the District of Colum-
bia have also allowed tolling of successive classes in some situations.1 23
97, 99 (3d Cir. 2004); Catholic Soc. Servs., Inc. v. INS, 232 F.3d 1139, 1149 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc);
City Select Auto Sales, Inc. v. David Randall Assocs., No. 11-2658, 2012 WL 426267, at *3-4 (D.N.J.
Feb. 7, 2012); Hershey v. ExxonMobil Oil Corp., 278 F.R.D. 617, 622 (D. Kan. 2011); Villanueva v.
Davis Bancorp, Inc., No. 09 CV 7826, 2011 WL 2745936, at *4 (N.D. Ill. July 8, 2011); Gomez v. St.
Vincent Health, Inc., 622 F. Supp. 2d 710, 723 (S.D. Ind. 2008). But not all courts agree. See, e.g.,
Griffin v. Singletary, 17 F.3d 356, 359 (1lth Cir. 1994) (citing Salazar-Calderon v. Presidio Valley
Farmers Ass'n, 765 F.2d 1334, 1351 (5th Cir. 1985)); Breaux v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., Nos. 04-cv-
00191-EWN-MJW, 04-cv-00539-EWN-MJW, 2006 WL 2548260, at *12 (D. Col. Sept. 1, 2006), affd
in part, rev d in part on other grounds, 554 F.3d 854 (10th Cir. 2009); Contreras v. Ridge, 305 F. Supp.
2d 126, 134 n.4 (D.D.C. 2004); Vinson v. Seven Seventeen HB Phila. Corp., No. 2:00-cv-06334, 2001
WL 1774073, at *8 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 31, 2001).
116 Sawyer, 642 F.3d at 563.
117 Phipps, 925 F. Supp. 2d at 905.
118 See Sawyer, 642 F.3d at 562.
ll9 See Phipps v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 792 F.3d 637, 652 (6th Cir. 2015).
120 See Yang, 392 F.3d at 11; McKowan Lowe & Co. v. Jasmine, Ltd., 295 F.3d 380, 389 (3d Cir.
2002).
121 Great Plains Trust Co. v. Union Pac. R.R., 492 F.3d 986, 997 (8th Cir. 2007).
122 Emp'rs-Teamsters Local Nos. 175 & 505 Pension Trust Fund v. Anchor Capital Advisors, 498
F.3d 920, 925 (9th Cir. 2007); Catholic Soc. Servs. v. INS, 232 F.3d 1139, 1149 (9th Cir. 2000) (en
banc).
123 For example, in the Second Circuit, see Police & Fire Ret. Sys. v. Goldman, Sachs & Co., No.
10 Civ. 4429(MCG), 2014 WL 1257782, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 27, 2014), and In re Nat'l Austl. Bank
Sec. Litig., No. 03 Civ. 6537(BSJ), 2006 WL 3844463, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 8, 2006). In the Third
Circuit, see City Select Auto Sales, Inc. v. David Randall Assocs., No. 11-2658, 2012 WL 426267, at *
3-4 (D.N.J. Feb. 7, 2012). In the Tenth Circuit, see Hershey v. ExxonMobil Oil Corp., 278 F.R.D. 617,
621 (D. Kan. 2011). And in the D.C. Circuit, see Shields v. Wash. Bancorporation, No. 90-ll01(RCL),
1992 WL 88004, at *3 (D.D.C. Apr. 7, 1992).
2016] PREDICTABILITY AND CONSISTENCY IN CLASS ACTION TOLLING
These courts have rejected the rigidity of a bright-line prohibition against
successive class action tolling, despite that approach's apparent "virtue of
clarity and ease of application." 24
Some courts that allow successive class action tolling base their deci-
sions on the fact that the original class action did not result in a certification
decision.1 25 Because no court had previously denied a class certification
request, these courts reason, tolling limitations for the later class action
does not encourage repetitive and indefinite class action lawsuits.1 26 Some
courts also allow successive class action tolling even when a court denies
an earlier certification request, as long as the reasons for the first certifica-
tion's failure does not have to do with 'a Rule 23 deficiency in the class
itself,' such as a lack of numerosity or a failure of the common questions to
predominate over the individual questions." 27 For example, these courts
permit successive class action tolling if the earlier certification denial re-
sulted from deficiencies of a class representative.1 28 In this type of case, the
risk that plaintiffs might otherwise indefinitely file repetitive class actions
addressing the same claims is not as high.1 29
Courts adopting the limited exceptions approach to successive class
action tolling observe that to not allow tolling in any circumstance could
totally undermine the American Pipe class tolling rule, which encourages
class members to rely on a class action to protect their interests as to claims
that are covered by the class action.' Unnamed class members have no
control over whether named plaintiffs decide to abandon the class actions or
over whether they are appropriate lead plaintiffs. ' A bright-line prohibi-
tion, according to these courts, would thus be arbitrary and would deny
"many class plaintiffs with small, potentially meritorious claims the oppor-
tunity for redress simply because they were unlucky enough to rely upon an
inappropriate lead plaintiff."'32 A bright-line prohibition would also encour-
age class members to file protective class actions, which would frustrate the
124 Yang, 392 F.3d at 106.
125 See, e.g., In re Vertrue Inc. Mktg. & Sales Practices Litig., 719 F.3d 474, 479-80 (6th Cir.
2013).
126 See, e.g., id. at 480.
127 Wasserman, supra note 4, at 848 (footnote omitted) (quoting Yang, 392 F.3d at 104). Of course,
in Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, the Supreme Court held the class did not satisfy commonality re-
quirement, and the later-filed subclass actions attempted to remedy this defect.
128 Id. (suggesting courts follow this approach at a time when the majority of circuit courts that had
considered successive class action tolling had rejected it).
129 See, e.g., Yang, 392 F.3d at 107.
130 See, e.g., id. at I10-11
131 See, e.g., Sawyer v. Atlas Heating & Sheet Metal Works, Inc., 731 F. Supp. 2d 850, 853 (E.D.
Wis. 2010), affd, 642 F.3d 560 (7th Cir. 2011).
132 Yang, 392 F.3d at 111.
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efficiency and economy of litigation the American Pipe tolling rule was
designed to protect. 113
In In re Vertrue Inc. Marketing and Sales Practices Litigation,13 4 the
Sixth Circuit pulled back from the bright-line prohibition approach it had
articulated in Andrews' and allowed successive class action tolling be-
cause class certification had not been decided in the earlier case.13 6 It distin-
guished Andrews because the earlier court in In re Vertrue had dismissed
the prior putative class action on grounds of standing, as opposed to on
grounds related to the class certification, so the danger of serial relitigation
of the certification decision was not present.'
Returning to the post-Wal-Mart subclass actions, immediately after the
Sixth Circuit decided In re Vertrue, the Tennessee district court certified an
interlocutory appeal of its "reluctant" decision.' In doing so, it noted the
Sixth Circuit's jurisprudence on the question was evolving, and the district
court had earlier "expressed serious reservations about the propriety of ap-
plying Andrews to follow-on subclass actions without providing for case-
specific exceptions, including those recognized in various other federal trial
and appellate court decisions."' The Tennessee district court concluded
that Andrews invited refinement and tailoring so courts could fairly balance
considerations of (1) whether applying tolling would further American
Pipe's concern for judicial economy and notice to defendants; and (2)
whether plaintiffs were attempting to abuse the benefit of tolling by perpet-
ually re-litigating certification or by asserting new claims not covered by
the earlier action, or whether they were attempting simply to obtain a defin-
itive, merits-based ruling on class certification.1 40 Thus, granting the inter-
locutory appeal was appropriate. 4 '
133 See id.
134 719 F.3d 474 (6th Cir. 2013).
135 Andrews v. Orr, 851 F.2d 146, 149 (6th Cir. 1988).
136 In re Vertrue Inc., 719 F.3d at 479-80.
137 id
138 Phipps v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., No. 3:12-cv-1009, 2013 WL 2897961, at *3-4 (M.D. Tenn.
June 13, 2013).
139 Id. at *I (recognizing the Sixth Circuit's recent decision in In re Vertrue Inc. Marketing and
Sales Practices Litigation may have eroded the bright-line prohibition against tolling successive class
actions).
140 Phipps v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 925 F. Supp. 2d 875, 897 (M.D. Tenn. 2013), rev'd, 792 F.3d
637 (6th Cir. 2015).
141 Phipps, 2013 WL 2897961, at *4. As discussed below, in its decision in Phipps, the Sixth
Circuit embraced the Seventh Circuit's satisfaction approach to successive class action tolling, the
approach for which this Article advocates. Phipps, 792 F.3d at 652.
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3. Satisfaction Approach
The Seventh and more recently the Sixth Circuit have adopted an ap-
proach that treats tolling limitations for later-filed class actions the same
way it treats tolling limitations for later-filed individual actions. 4 2 While
the failure of an earlier class action may have implications for future at-
tempts to certify the alleged class, according to this approach, "the statute
of limitations is not one of them.""' The issue, as framed by these circuits,
is not whether tolling should apply to the later-filed class action, but rather
whether the later-filed class action meets the requirements of Rule 23.'"
This approach interprets earlier decisions that rejected successive class ac-
tion tolling as having held the original certification decisions continued to
apply in the later-filed class actions; thus, even though the later-filed class
actions were timely, class members could not evade the earlier certification
decisions by filing successive class actions.'45 In other words, the decisions
that had appeared to adopt the bright-line prohibition approach had instead
merely ruled on the preclusive influence of earlier decisions that had de-
clined to certify the class actions.'46 Under this approach, later-filed class
actions are deemed timely filed if under American Pipe the claims would
not be time-barred if brought as individual actions.
The rationale underlying this approach is that refusing to apply Ameri-
can Pipe tolling to subsequent class actions would undermine the efficiency
that class action tolling rule was meant to promote.' 47 Specifically, it would
encourage plaintiffs to file protective lawsuits when they should instead be
encouraged to wait to see if the first class action would protect their
rights.'48 "The weight of individual filings would strain the federal courts.
This is precisely the scenario that 'Rule 23 was designed to avoid' in cases
where adjudication of claims by class action is a fair and efficient method
of resolving a dispute."'49 Encouraging protective filings is inconsistent
with the Supreme Court's adoption of the American Pipe class action
142 See Phipps, 792 F.3d at 653 (holding plaintiffs' subsequent successive Rule 23(b)(2) subclass
action was timely filed, even though the Supreme Court had earlier decertified the original alleged
23(b)(2) class action); Sawyer v. Atlas Heating & Sheet Metal Works, Inc., 642 F.3d 560, 564 (7th Cir.
2011) (holding successive class action tolling allowed in case where earlier court had not reached a
decision on class certification, but opining in dicta regarding the state of the law on successive class
action tolling in other circuits).
143 Ladik v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 291 F.R.D. 263, 268 (W.D. Wis. 2013).
144 Phipps, 792 F.3d at 651-52.
145 Id. at 652; Sawyer, 642 F.3d at 564.
146 Phipps, 792 F.3d at 651-52 (quoting Judge Easterbrook's opinion in Sawyer, 642 F.3d at 563).
147 Ladik, 291 F.R.D. at 268.
148 Id. at 268.
149 Phipps, 792 F.3d at 652-53 (quoting Am. Pipe & Constr. Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538, 551, 553-
54 (1974)) (citing Wyser-Pratte Mgmt. Co. v. Telxon Corp., 413 F.3d 553, 569 (6th Cir. 2005)).
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rule.'" Considering the purposes underlying statutes of limitations, these
courts reason that the original class action provides defendants with notice
of the claims against them and the generic identities of the members of the
alleged class.'"' Although courts following this approach generally recog-
nize that there are "legitimate concerns about re-litigating class issues,"
they conclude that limiting the application of American Pipe tolling to indi-
vidual suits is not the proper way to address those concerns.5 2
Returning again to the post-Wal-Mart subclass actions, one group of
plaintiffs filed in Wisconsin, which is in the Seventh Circuit.' Thus, fol-
lowing the satisfaction approach, the district court held plaintiffs' subclass
action timely because the original plaintiffs had timely filed the original
class action against Wal-Mart.'54 Going back to the Tennessee case, adopt-
ing the satisfaction approach to successive class action tolling, the Sixth
Circuit held the Tennessee plaintiffs' subclass action claims were timely as
well. "
4. Continued Adherence to a Bright-Line Prohibition
Taking stock of the four post-Wal-Mart successive subclass actions,
the decisions had gone from three classes being held untimely and one be-
ing held timely to three classes being held timely and one being held un-
timely. These decisions strikingly illustrate the lack of consistency and pre-
dictability in successive class action tolling cases. Analyzing these deci-
sions, it is clear that the articulations of bright-line prohibitions against ap-
plying American Pipe tolling to successive class actions made it more, ra-
ther than less, difficult for courts to reach coherent conclusions. After so
many courts had moved away from bright-line prohibitions against succes-
150 Ladik, 291 F.R.D. at 268 (quoting Gomez v. St. Vincent Health, Inc., 622 F. Supp. 2d 710, 718-
19 (S.D. Ind. 2008)).
151 Id. at 268-69 (citing Gomez, 622 F. Supp. 2d at 722).
152 Id. at 269; see also Phipps, 792 F.3d at 652. In its discussion of this issue, the Sixth Circuit
relies largely on the Fifth Circuit's reversal in Odle. Phipps, 792 F.3d at 648 (citing Odle v. Wal-Mart
Stores, Inc., 747 F.3d 315 (5th Cir. 2014)). In the Odle appeal, however, Ms. Odle pursued only her
individual claims against Wal-Mart. Odle, 747 F.3d at 319 & n.20 (limiting appeal of tolling decision to
timeliness of individual claims). Thus, the Fifth Circuit's discussion of the successive class claims in
that case is mere dicta.
153 Ladik, 291 F.R.D. at 263.
154 Id. at 268. While the court in Ladik ultimately held plaintiffs' successive class claims failed for
lack of commonality, it nevertheless made clear that limitations did not bar those successive class action
claims. Id. at 264-65.
155 Phipps, 792 F.3d at 653. In doing so, as to the class allegations on which certification had not
been decided, the Sixth Circuit followed In re Vertrue to allow successive class action tolling. Id. As to
the class that had been decertified by the Supreme Court, it adopted a satisfaction approach to class
action tolling that was first articulated by the Seventh Circuit. See id. at 652-53 (citing Sawyer v. Atlas
Heating & Sheet Metal Works, Inc., 642 F.3d 560, 564 (7th Cir. 2011)).
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sive class action tolling, and the Sixth and Seventh Circuits had character-
ized those bright-line prohibition decisions as having merely applied the
original certification decisions to the later-filed class actions,'16 it appeared
federal jurisprudence on successive class action tolling was becoming more
cohesive.
But after these developments, the Eleventh Circuit decided the Ewing
Industries Corp. v. Bob Wines Nursery, Inc.'" case in which it again stated,
"the pendency of a previously filed class action does not toll the limitations
period for additional class actions by putative class members of the original
asserted class."' In the opinion, the court made clear it disagreed with oth-
er circuits that had distinguished, criticized, or declined to follow its earlier
decision in Griffin v. Singletary,'5 9 where it had refused to toll limitations
when the earlier class action had failed because of a deficiency related to
the class representative.' 6 0 Griffin concluded it did not matter whether certi-
fication of the earlier class action had failed because of the inadequacy of
the class representative or because of deficiencies in the alleged class it-
self.'"' Instead, the Eleventh Circuit cited concerns about "the potential for
multiple rounds of litigation as the class seeks an adequate class representa-
tive" and refused to toll limitations for the later-filed class action.1 6 2
But perhaps some slight movement away from the bright-line prohibi-
tion approach may be taken from the Ewing opinion. After reaching its con-
clusion, the court stated that the merits of the earlier case were not before
it.'16 In addition, it pointed out that the Eleventh Circuit's prior precedent
rule did not allow one panel to overrule another panel's holding.1" While
the court did not say more, these sentences can be interpreted to imply a
less than total embrace of Griffin's articulated bright-line prohibition ap-
proach.
156 Phipps, 792 F.3d at 652; Sawyer, 642 F.3d at 564.
157 795 F.3d 1324 (11 th Cir. 2015).
158 Id. at 1327 (quoting Griffin v. Singletary, 17 F.3d 356, 359 (11th Cir. 1994)) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
159 17 F.3d 356 (11th Cir. 1994).
160 Ewing Indus. Corp., 795 F.3d at 1328 (quoting Sawyer, 642 F.3d at 564) (citing In re Vertrue
Inc. Mktg. & Sales Practices Litig., 719 F.3d 474, 480 n.2 (6th Cir. 2013); Great Plains Trust Co. v.
Union Pac. R.R., 492 F.3d 986, 997 (8th Cir. 2007); Yang v. Odom, 392 F.3d 97, 106 (3d Cir. 2004);
Catholic Soc. Servs., Inc. v. INS, 232 F.3d 1139, 1148-50 (9th Cir. 2000)).
161 Id. (interpreting Griffin, 17 F.3d at 359).
162 id
163 id.
164 Id. (citing United States v. Steele, 147 F.3d 1316, 1317-18 (1lth Cir. 1998) (en banc)).
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5. Shady Grove and Bayer
While the recent Supreme Court decisions in the 2010 and 2011 cases
of Shady Grove Orthopedic Associates, P.A. v. Allstate Insurance Co.'65 and
Smith v. Bayer Corp.166 did not involve class action tolling, they provide
relevant context. Indeed, with varying degrees of success, three groups of
post- Wal-Mart plaintiffs argued Shady Grove and Bayer required the dis-
trict courts to apply American Pipe tolling to their later-filed class ac-
tions.1 67 Thus, a brief description of these cases is helpful.
Shady Grove is a federal preemption case in which the Supreme Court,
in a plurality opinion, held that Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure prevailed over a conflicting New York statute that prohibited plaintiffs
from a proceeding as a class action when they sought recovery of a penal-
ty'1 68 In a part of the opinion in which a majority joined, Justice Scalia char-
acterized the issue, simply, as whether the plaintiff s suit could proceed as a
class action, and he concluded that Rule 23 had to provide the answer.1 69
Rule 23 allows class action treatment if two conditions are met: the class
meets the requirements set forth in subdivision (a), and the class fits into
one of the three categories set forth in subdivision (b).o Rule 23, therefore,
"creates a categorical rule entitling a plaintiff whose suit meets the speci-
fied criteria to pursue his claim as a class action.""' In other words, Rule 23
is "a one-size-fits-all formula for deciding" whether a plaintiff may main-
tain a class action in federal court.1 72
Rejecting the argument that the New York statute and Rule 23 ad-
dressed the different questions of whether a particular cause of action is
eligible for class treatment and whether the cause of action may be certified
as a class action, Justice Scalia wrote, "the line between eligibility and
certifiability is entirely artificial." 7 1 If the "prescribed preconditions" of
165 559 U.S. 393 (2010) (plurality opinion).
166 131 S. Ct. 2368 (2011).
167 Love v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., No. 12-61959-Civ, 2013 WL 5434565, at *4 (S.D. Fla. dis-
missed Sept. 23, 2013); Phipps v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 925 F. Supp. 2d 875, 899 (M.D. Tenn. 2013)
(holding, reluctantly, that the subclass could not benefit from American Pipe tolling), rev'd, 792 F.3d
637 (6th Cir. 2015); Odle v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., No. 3:1 1-cv-2954-O, 2012 WL 5292957, at *8 (N.D.
Tex. Oct. 15, 2012), rev'd, 747 F.3d 315 (5thCir. 2014).
168 Shady Grove, 559 U.S. at 396 n.1, 398-401 (quoting FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a)-(b); N.Y. C.P.L.R.
§ 901 (McKinney 2006)). For thoughtful critiques of, among other things, how the Court in Shady Gove
failed to clarify the operations of Rule 23, the Rules Enabling Act, and the rulemaking process, see
Stephen B. Burbank & Tobias Barrington Wolff, Redeeming the Missed Opportunities of Shady Grove,
159 U. PA. L. REV. 17, 23-53 (2010).
169 Shady Grove, 559 U.S. at 398-99.
170 Id. at 398.
171 Id.
172 Id. at 399.
173 Id.
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Rule 23 are satisfied, plaintiffs have discretion to bring their claims as class
actions if they wish because, "like the rest of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, Rule 23 automatically applies 'in all civil actions and proceed-
ings in the United States district courts."'
1 74
Like the Shady Grove case, the Bayer case also does not directly ad-
dress class action tolling. Rather, in Bayer, the Court considered whether a
federal court could, consistent with the Anti-Injunction Act,' enjoin a state
court from certifying an essentially identical class action in state court after
the federal court had declined to certify a nearly identical class action in
federal court.'17 The defendant argued that the federal court's denial of class
certification precluded the state court from certifying what was basically the
same class.'17 Finding the relitigation exception to the Anti-Injunction Act
gave it authority, the federal district court issued the injunction.' The
eighth circuit affirmed, but again the Supreme Court reversed.'
The Court framed the issue as follows: "whether the federal court's re-
jection of [the] proposed class precluded a later adjudication in state court
of [the class action] certification motion."' For the injunction to have been
proper, two requirements had to have been met.'' First, the issue decided
by the federal court had to be the same as the issue presented to the state
court.'82 Second, the plaintiffs in the state case had to also be parties to the
federal action, or otherwise subject to one of the narrow exceptions that
would allow binding nonparties.'" Neither requirement was met in Bayer.'"
While the first requirement is not implicated in the context of successive
class actions where both actions are filed in federal court, as discussed be-
low, the second is.
In its holding, the Supreme Court opined that Bayer's strongest argu-
ment for enjoining certification of the state class action was rooted in policy
concerns related to the use of the class action device and not in legal princi-
174 Id. at 399-400 (quoting FED. R. Civ. P. 1) (citing Califano v. Yamasaki, 442 U.S. 682, 699-700
(1979)).
175 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (2012).
176 Smith v. Bayer Corp., 131 S. Ct. 2368, 2373 (2011). The Court in Bayer focused on the
relitigation exception to the Anti-Injunction Act. Id. at 2377. But its analysis also suggests the denial of
certification cannot be used to preclude other plaintiffs' later attempts to certify a class. Id. at 2380-81
(quoting Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880, 901 (2008) (rejecting the argument that the public law nature
of Freedom of Information Act requests supported the adoption of a "virtual representation" exception
to the rule against nonparty claim preclusion)).
177 Id. at 2379.
178 Id at 2374.
179 Id. at 2374-75.
180 Id at 2376.
181 Id.
182 Bayer, 131 S. Ct. at 2376.
183 Id.
184 Id.
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ples of preclusion.' The Court acknowledged, for example, the theoretical
danger that class counsel could repeatedly attempt to certify the same class
by changing the named plaintiff and thus effectively forcing defendants to
settle.' 6 It further recognized that, in theory, its approach could lead to class
counsel repeatedly attempting to certify the same class with different named
plaintiffs, resulting in a "world of 'serial relitigation of class certification'
in which defendants "'would be forced in effect to buy litigation peace by
settling.""" The Court, however, reasoned that it had earlier confronted a
similar problem in Taylor v. Sturgell.'" There, after successfully resisting a
Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request, the government sought to bind
nonparties from seeking identical requests in the future, under a theory of
"virtual representation."'" The Court, however, refused to expand preclu-
sion in this way, even though it acknowledged a single successful FOIA
suit could subsume all prior losses just like "a single successful class certi-
fication motion could do."' Despite characterizing the potential costs re-
lated to this concern as "substantial," the Court concluded that principles of
stare decisis would outweigh the risks of repeated litigation.'
D. Analysis and Recommendations
Successive class action tolling cases can arise in a number of ways.
Sometimes the original class action ends before a certification decision is
reached.'92 Other times, certification may fail for reasons that can be cor-
rected, such as when named plaintiffs are not qualified to represent the
class. '" Still other times, certification may fail for reasons inherent to the
alleged class action's ability to proceed as a class, which cannot be correct-
ed, such as when the number of claimants is not sufficiently large to meet
the numerosity requirement.1' As illustrated by the post- Wal-Mart subclass
actions, applying different approaches, some of which depend on the way in
which the successive class action tolling cases arise and some of which do
185 Id. at 2381.
186 Id. (quoting Brief for Respondent at 47-48, Bayer, 131 S. Ct. 2368 (No. 09-1205)). The Court
also noted the Seventh Circuit's earlier objection "to an 'an asymmetric system in which class counsel
can win but never lose' because of their ability to relitigate the issue of certification." Id. (quoting In re
Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., Tires Prods. Liab. Litig., 333 F.3d 763, 767 (7th Cir. 2003)).
187 Id. (quoting Brief for Respondent, supra note 186, at 2, 12).
188 Bayer, 131 S. Ct. at 2381 (citing Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880 (2008)).
189 Id. at 2380 (quoting Taylor, 553 U.S. at 901) (internal quotation marks omitted).
190 Id. at 2381.
191 Id.
192 See, e.g., In re Vertrue Inc. Mktg. & Sales Practices Litig., 719 F.3d 474, 479-80 (6th Cir.
2013).
193 See, e.g., Yang v. Odom, 392 F.3d 97, 99 (3d Cir. 2004).
194 See, e.g., Am. Pipe & Constr. Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538, 553-54 (1974).
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not, can result in inconsistent and unpredictable outcomes. For example, in
cases in which certification decisions had not have been reached in the ear-
lier cases, both the limited exceptions and satisfaction approaches would
allow tolling for the later alleged class action, but the bright-line prohibition
approach would not.' Under the bright-line prohibition approach, whether
the earlier court reached a certification decision or not would not matter as
tolling would not be allowed either way.
At first blush, the bright-line prohibition approach is attractive because
the answer to the successive class action tolling issue appears to be straight-
forward: no tolling. Indeed, in general, bright-line rules are thought to pro-
mote clarity and ease of application.'9 6 But as illustrated by the district
court's opinion in the post-Wal-Mart subclass action filed in Tennessee, the
application of the bright-line prohibition was not at all straightforward
there, and instead it gave the court considerable trouble. Unlike situations in
which plaintiffs have attempted to relitigate the same certification question
over and over, plaintiffs in the post- Wal-Mart cases were attempting to cor-
rect a deficiency identified only after a change in the law, which plaintiffs
could not have foreseen. Under those circumstances, the Tennessee district
court struggled with holding the plaintiffs' subclass action claims were
time-barred. 19
Indeed, it enumerated several reasons why the application of a rigid-
bright-line prohibition could frustrate the policies underlying American
Pipe tolling.' One reason is that the application of the bright-line prohibi-
tion in cases like the post-Wal-Mart subclass actions would likely encour-
age rather than discourage multiplicitous litigation.' Cautious members of
putative nationwide classes who reside in jurisdictions that have either
adopted the bright-line approach, or have not definitively rejected it, would
be encouraged to file protective subclass actions around the country rather
than to rely on a nationwide class that could fail to be certified before the
applicable limitations periods expired. Indeed, to protect their interests,
cautious members might also chose to file protective subclass actions in
195 So, as long as the later alleged class allegations were covered by the earlier class allegations,
the later alleged class action would be timely, unless plaintiffs filed it in a circuit that follows the bright-
line prohibition approach. Compare, e.g., Phipps v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 792 F.3d 637, 651 (6th Cir.
2015), and In re Vertrue, 719 F.3d at 479-80, and Sawyer v. Atlas Heating & Sheet Metal Works, Inc.,
642 F.3d 560, 563 (7th Cir. 2011), with Ewing Indus. Corp. v. Bob Wines Nursery, Inc., 795 F.3d 1324,
1328 (11th Cir. 2015).
196 See, e.g., Yang, 392 F.3d at 106 (noting bright-line prohibition's "clarity and ease of applica-
tion").
197 Phipps v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., No. 3:12-cv-1009, 2013 WL 2897961, at *3 (M.D. Tenn. June
13, 2013) (noting in the district court's Memorandum-certifying an interlocutory review to the Sixth
Circuit-that it had "reluctantly" dismissed the plaintiffs' claims as time barred in its earlier decision).
198 Phipps v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 925 F. Supp. 2d 875, 893-97 (M.D. Tenn. 2013), rev'd, 792
F.3d 637 (6th Cir. 2015).
199 See id at 895 (quoting Yang, 392 F.3d at 111).
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cases in which the original class had been certified so that if the nationwide
class were to fail later, these plaintiffs' class claims would be still protected.
Although plaintiffs might prefer to rely on the class action, as the California
district court in the original Wal-Mart class action suggested, plaintiffs who
had timely filed overlapping (but narrower or differently configured) class
actions would be in the stronger position of seeking to amend already exist-
ing class actions instead of filing a new subclass action that would likely be
time-barred.200
A rigid bright-line prohibition can have other undesirable effects as
well. In some cases, applying such a rule would frustrate the goal of allow-
ing claimants in negative-value class actions the ability to pursue their
claims. Without the availability of class action treatment, claimants in nega-
tive-value cases would not be able to spread the costs of litigation among
the class.20 ' Thus, plaintiffs with small, but meritorious, claims could be
denied the opportunity to pursue those claims if, for example, they relied on
a lead plaintiff who was not found to be inappropriate until after the appli-
cable limitations period had expired.202 If limitations had passed and pursu-
ing an individual action were not feasible, plaintiffs could lose the only
viable means to access the courts to seek compensation for those claims.203
Rigid application of bright-line prohibitions could similarly frustrate
the goals of ensuring substantive laws are upheld and holding defendants
accountable for negative behaviors. Once the applicable limitations periods
passed, defendants would have a great deal of power, especially in nega-
tive-value cases, because successive class actions would be time-barred. A
bright-line prohibition could thus serve to encourage defendants to attempt
to delay certification decisions in the hope that they would have increased
power once the limitations periods expired. For several reasons, therefore, a
strict adherence to a bright-line prohibition against successive class action
tolling no matter what takes too seriously the oft-repeated warning that the
American Pipe tolling rule "is a generous one, inviting abuse."204
Comparing the limited exceptions and satisfaction approaches, the sat-
isfaction approach is superior, especially in light of Shady Grove and
Bayer. If a prior class failed for reasons unrelated to the propriety of the
class, both the approaches would allow tolling to save limitations for the
200 See Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., No. C 01-02252 CRB, 2012 WL 4329009, at *8 (N.D. Cal.
Sept. 21, 2012).
201 See Phipps, 925 F. Supp. 2d at 895 (quoting Yang, 392 F.3d at 111).
202 Id. (quoting Yang, 392 F.3d at 11).
203 Id. (quoting Yang, 392 F.3d at 111); see also HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, DISSENTING
VIEWS TO H.R. 3789, CLASS ACTION JURISDICTION ACT OF 1998, H.R. REP. No. 105-702, at 22 (1998)
(discussing class treatment's importance in providing redress when negative value claims are involved);
cf Landers, supra note 40, at 857-60 (expressing normative preference that the Supreme Court should
not be able to narrow the reach of legislative, class-action remedies through the use ofjudicial rules).
204 Crown, Cork & Seal Co. v. Parker, 462 U.S. 345, 354 (1983) (Powell, J., concurring).
364 [VOL. 23:2
2016] PREDICTABILITY AND CONSISTENCY IN CLASS ACTION TOLLING
later alleged class.205 On the other hand, if the prior class failed because of a
Rule 23-related deficiency in the class itself, the limited exceptions ap-
proach would not allow tolling, while the satisfaction approach would.
There are some benefits, of course, to the limited exceptions approach.
While the satisfaction approach would always allow tolling if the plaintiffs
timely filed the earlier alleged class action, the limited exceptions approach
appropriately takes into account issues of fairness and allows courts to
weigh the benefits and costs of tolling in each particular case.206 Courts
would find later-filed class action timely only if applying tolling would
further American Pipe's concerns for furthering judicial economy while
still providing sufficient notice to defendants.207 This approach allows suc-
cessive class action tolling in cases in which the class deficiency could be
addressed but does not allow it otherwise.208 In this way, it eliminates the
risk that plaintiffs would attempt to abuse the benefit of tolling by perpetu-
ally re-litigating certification or by asserting new claims not covered by the
earlier action.209 Under this approach, plaintiffs could pursue class claims
only until a court has definitively determined that the claims are not suitable
for class treatment. This approach still protects plaintiffs with small, but
potentially meritorious claims, allowing them the ability to seek redress as a
class, when those claims would not support individual lawsuits.210 Indeed
the limited exceptions approach would protect all unnamed class members
who properly relied on a class action to protect their interests, while at the
same time alleviating the risk that plaintiffs might indefinitely file repetitive
class actions addressing the same claims.21 '
Prior to Bayer, the limited exceptions approach would likely have
made the most sense because it polices for abuse while allowing tolling in
appropriate cases. The Supreme Court's holding in Bayer, however, can be
read to undermine the limited exceptions approach to the extent that it re-
quires courts to decline to extend tolling because of an earlier court's deci-
sion to deny class certification. Remember, in Bayer, the Court reiterated
preclusion could apply only if the plaintiffs in the later case were also par-
ties to the earlier case or otherwise subject to one of the narrow exceptions
that would allow binding nonparties.212 Thus, the argument would be that in
205 See discussion supra Parts II.C.2-3.
206 See, e.g., Yang, 392 F.3d at 112.
207 See Phipps v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 925 F. Supp. 2d 875, 897 (M.D. Tenn. 2013), rev'd, 792
F.3d 637 (6th Cir. 2015); see also Wasserman, supra note 4, at 849-50.
208 See, e.g., Phipps, 925 F. Supp. 2d at 895 (quoting Yang, 392 F.3d at 111).
209 See id. at 897; see also Wasserman, supra note 4, at 849.
210 See, e.g., Yang, 392 F.3d at 100-11.
211 See, e.g., id.
212 Smith v. Bayer Corp., 131 S. Ct. 2368, 2382 (2011). The Court in Bayer focused on the
relitigation exception to the Anti-Injunction Act. Id. at 2375-76. But its analysis also suggested the
denial of certification cannot have a preclusive effect on other plaintiffs' later attempts to certify a class.
Id. at 2380 (quoting Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880, 901 (2008) (rejecting the argument that the public
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the context of tolling, an earlier denial of class certification could not bind
absent class members who later file class action lawsuits because, by reason
of the court's decision not to certify the class action, the unnamed class
members would not be considered to have been parties to the earlier ac-
tion. 2 13 Being nonparties, the earlier denial of certification could not apply
to them. Thus, the earlier denial of certification could not be used as justifi-
cation to refuse to apply American Pipe tolling to later-filed class actions if
such tolling would apply to later-filed individual claims.
In addition, to the extent the limited exceptions approach requires later
courts to decide the propriety of the earlier alleged class before deciding
whether tolling should be allowed, the limited exceptions approach can lead
to inefficiencies and encourage side litigation. To decide whether to toll
limitations for later-filed class actions under the limited exceptions ap-
proach, the later court first would have to determine whether the prior court
reached a certification decision. If class certification were denied earlier,
the later court would need to decide why the earlier alleged class failed
before it could decide whether to toll limitations for the later-filed class
action. If the original class failed for a reason that could be corrected, the
court would then toll limitations for the successive class action. Otherwise
it would not. Only after answering these questions would the later court be
able to consider whether the later-filed class met the criteria of Rule 23,
which implicates the Court's decision in Shady Grove.
Shady Grove, can be read to undermine any approach that would fail
to toll limitations for a covered, later-filed class action that could qualify for
class treatment. Shady Grove suggests that when a later class action meets
the criteria of Rule 23, class treatment must be allowed. Although Shady
Grove involved a question of preemption, a majority of the Court in an oth-
erwise plurality opinion agreed that Rule 23 must provide the answer to the
question of whether an action may proceed as a class action in federal
courts.2"4 The opinion characterizes Rule 23 as a "categorical rule entitling a
plaintiff whose suit meets the specified criteria to pursue his claim as a
class action," and "a one-size-fits-all formula for deciding" whether a plain-
tiff may maintain a class action.2"5 Therefore, to the extent a later-filed class
law nature of Freedom of Information Act requests supported the adoption of a "virtual representation"
exception to the rule against nonparty claim preclusion)).
213 Id. Some courts have read Bayer narrowly and rejected claims by plaintiffs who clearly had
hoped for an expansive interpretation of Bayer. See Love v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., No. 12-61959-Civ,
2013 WL 5434565, at *4 (S.D. Fla. dismissed Sept. 23, 2013) (acknowledging but distinguishing Bayer
and then dismissing the plaintiffs' class claims); Phipps, 925 F. Supp. 2d at 897-900 (finding that nei-
ther Bayer nor Shady Grove overruled Andrews-the relevant Sixth Circuit precedent); Odle v. Wal-
Mart Stores, Inc., No. 3:11 -cv-2954-O, 2012 WL 5292957, at *8-9 (N.D. Tex. Oct. 15, 2012) (interpret-
ing Bayer narrowly and rejecting plaintiffs individual claims).
214 Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 559 U.S. 393, 398 (2010) (plurality opin-
ion).
2t5 Id. at 398-99.
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action could qualify for class action treatment under Rule 23, Shady Grove
suggests tolling must apply to save limitations for that class action, as long
as such tolling would have applied to a later-filed individual action. Of
course, since Shady Grove involved preemption rather than tolling, one
reasonably could argue that applying the "one-size-fits-all formula" lan-
guage in this way interprets the Court's decision too broadly.
Read with Bayer, however, Shady Grove provides further support for
following the satisfaction approach to successive class action tolling. Under
the satisfaction approach, as long as the original class action is timely filed,
the applicable statutes of limitations for later-filed, covered class actions are
considered met. The analysis, therefore, would not offend Bayer by reject-
ing tolling based on an earlier denial of class certification. And consistent
with Shady Grove, this approach focuses on the propriety of the later al-
leged class under Rule 23, rather than whether successive class action toll-
ing should apply to the class. Such an approach is not without downsides,
of course. Indeed, because it in effect nearly always allows tolling, this ap-
proach is the most likely to be seen as an "encouragement to lawyers . . . to
frame their pleadings as a class action, intentionally, to attract and save
members of the purported class who have slept on their rights."216 Thus, an
argument could be made that allowing successive class action tolling would
rob the defendants of the repose promised by statutes of limitations by theo-
retically subjecting defendants to endless rounds of litigation over class
certification. Nevertheless, despite the risk that "serial re-litigation of class
certification" could force defendants "in effect to buy litigation peace by
settling," the Court in Bayer concluded that "principles of stare decisis and
comity among courts" would "mitigate the sometimes substantial costs of
similar litigation brought by different plaintiffs."217
Given that an alleged class action that fails to meet Rule 23's criteria
can never be certified, the same principles should apply under the satisfac-
tion approach. Although more successive class actions would be found
timely under this approach, stare decises should mitigate the threat of re-
peated attempt to certify the same class with a new named plaintiff.2 18
While plaintiffs may, and the mere existence of successive class action cas-
es suggest they do, take multiple bites at the certification apple, costs
should deter repeated attempts to certify the same class action that had ear-
lier failed because of deficiencies inherent to the class rather than because
of defects that could be corrected in a later class. If the deficiency were
inherent to the class, it would be no surprise that a later class would fail on
the same grounds. Plaintiffs, therefore, would lack an economic incentive to
216 Am. Pipe & Constr. Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538, 561 (1974) (Blackmun, J., concurring).
217 Smith v. Bayer Corp., 131 S. Ct. 2368, 2381 (2011) (quoting Brief for Respondent, supra note
186, at 2, 12) (internal quotation marks omitted).
218 Id.
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file repetitive class allegations given that if repetitive classes were filed,
those classes would repeatedly fail to be certified.
Because the tolling questions will almost always be answered in favor
of tolling under this approach, the satisfaction approach is also the one least
likely encourage plaintiffs to file prophylactic, overlapping class actions.
Such protective filings would not be needed because as long as the earlier
class actions were timely, the later ones would be too. Plaintiffs, consistent
with American Pipe, would be encouraged to rely on the original class to
protect their rights. If the original class action failed, plaintiffs could deter-
mine why certification failed and make an informed decision about whether
to file a later class action based on the likelihood the later alleged class
could meet Rule 23's criteria.
The satisfaction approach is also consistent with policies underlying
statutes of limitations. Tolling is always limited to substantive claims cov-
ered by the original alleged class action; thus, claims that had been allowed
to slumber until evidence had been lost, memories had faded, and witnesses
had disappeared would not be tolled.2 19 Because the filing of the original
class action would operate to provide defendants notice of the claims
against them, as well as the number and general identities of the individuals
likely to have those claims, allowing tolling under this approach would be
consistent with the policy of promoting justice and preventing unfair sur-
220prise.
Comparing the various approaches to successive class action tolling
and considering the underlying policies, along with Bayer and Shady
Grove, the approach of allowing successive class action tolling whenever
tolling would be allowed for later-filed individual claims is the most prefer-
able. This approach prevents protracted litigation about tolling and instead
allows courts and litigants to focus on the propriety of class certification.
Thus, when class action tolling would save limitations for individual
claims, rather than litigating the propriety of successive class action tolling
in a later alleged class action, litigants and courts should focus on the likely
viability of the later-filed class action.
219 Crown, Cork & Seal Co. v. Parker, 462 U.S. 345, 352-54 (1983); Am. Pipe, 414 U.S. at 554
(quoting Order of R.R. Telegraphers v. Ry. Express Agency, Inc., 321 U.S. 342, 348-49 (1944)).
220 See Crown, Cork & Seal Co., 462 U.S. at 352-54 (citing Delaware State Coll. v. Ricks, 449
U.S. 250, 256-57 (1980); Am. Pipe, 414 U.S. at 561 (Blackmun, J., concurring); Burnett v. New York
Cent. R.R., 380 U.S. 424, 428 (1965)); Am. Pipe, 414 U.S. at 554-55 (quoting Burnett, 380 U.S. at 428;
Order of R.R. Telegraphers, 321 U.S. at 348-49). For a more in-depth discussion of the policies underly-
ing statutes of limitations, see Wasserman, supra note 4, at 810-13.
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III. CROSS-JURISDICTIONAL TOLLING
Cross-jurisdictional tolling refers to when courts in one jurisdiction are
asked to toll the applicable statutes of limitations relying on class actions
filed in other jurisdictions.2 2 ' The analysis of cross-jurisdictional tolling can
be incredibly complicated, implicating, among other things, choice of law
and federalism issues. Cross-jurisdictional tolling issues may arise when
parties file a class action in federal court, and plaintiffs in a state court ac-
tion attempt to rely on the alleged federal class to toll limitations in the state
court.22 2 In addition, cross-jurisdictional tolling issues may arise when
plaintiffs in federal court attempt to rely on a class action filed in state court
to toll limitations in the federal court action.22 3 Finally, such issues also
arise when plaintiffs in one state attempt to rely on a class action filed in a
different state to toll limitations in the other state court action.
Just as the federal rules allow class treatment in certain kinds of cases,
the rules in all fifty states and the territories of Guam, Puerto Rico, and the
Virgin Islands allow class action treatment, at least in certain kinds of cas-
es.224 Indeed, most of the states' rules are modeled after, or even mirror,
Federal Rule 23 .225 The class certification standards in various states, how-
ever, often differ from the federal standards.22 6 In addition, just as federal
courts have long recognized the class action tolling rule for plaintiffs' indi-
vidual claims, most states have adopted American Pipe-like class action
221 See, e.g., Patterson v. Novartis Pharm. Corp., 909 F. Supp. 2d 116, 122-23 (D.R.I. 2012); Ste-
vens v. Novartis Pharm. Corp., 247 P.3d 244, 252 (Mont. 2010).
222 Some states do not allow tolling of individual's limitations periods during the pendency of class
action lawsuits. See, e.g., Becnel v. Deutsche Bank, 507 F. App'x 71, 73 (2d Cir. 2013) (stating Florida
does not allow class action tolling, no matter where the class is filed, and citing FLA. STAT. § 95.051(2)
(2012), which does not allow tolling except for reasons specified in the statute). If the state does not
recognize tolling in the first place, this discussion does not include them.
223 See, e.g., Sawyer v. Atlas Heating & Sheet Metal Works, Inc., 642 F.3d 560, 562-63 (7th Cir.
2011) ("Federal law determines the tolling effect of a suit governed by a federal statute of limitations.
American Pipe establishes that federal rule.").
224 Class Action Requirements, in 50 STATE STATUTORY SURVEYS: CIVIL LAWS: CIVIL
PROCEDURE, 0020 SURVEYS 2, Westlaw (database updated Apr. 2015).
225 See Laura J. Hines, Mirroring or Muscling: An Examination of State Class Action Appellate
Rulemaking, 58 U. KAN. L. REV. 1027, 1028 (2010) (analyzing whether states had changed their class
action appeals rules in light of the adoption of Rule 23(f) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, "given
that a majority of states have adopted civil procedural rules based on the model of the federal rules").
226 See, e.g., Smith v. Bayer Corp., 131 S. Ct. 2368, 2377 (2011) (criticizing the Eighth Circuit's
reliance on the "near-identity" of the text of the West Virginia class action rule to Federal Rule 23 and
reasoning that federal and state courts "can and do apply identically worded procedural provisions in
widely varying ways"); see also Note, Multistate Plaintiff Class Actions: Jurisdiction and Certification,
92 HARV. L. REV. 718, 718-19 (1979) (pointing out that at that time, most states had already offered
class procedures, and in the author's opinion, "in terms of efficiency and convenience for the class," the
state procedures "may equal or excel those that would otherwise have been available in federal court"
(footnotes omitted)).
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tolling rules.227 But these tolling rules often vary from state to state.228 State
courts, nevertheless, often rely on the policies underlying American Pipe
when analyzing the cross-jurisdictional tolling issues, and the Supreme
Court's class action tolling decisions have been characterized as "the foun-
dational analysis" for cross-jurisdictional tolling. 2 9
For a number of reasons, cases involving cross-jurisdictional tolling
are likely to arise with increasing frequency. For example, when Congress
passed CAFA in 2005, it federalized most of the nation's largest class ac-
tions.23 0 Prior to CAFA, parties could file overlapping nationwide class ac-
227 See, e.g., Albano v. Shea Homes Ltd. P'ship, 254 P.3d 360, 364 (Ariz. 2011) (en banc) (assum-
ing without deciding that American Pipe tolling applies to statutes of limitations in Arizona but rejecting
the same for Arizona's statute of repose); Grimes v. Hous. Auth., 698 A.2d 302, 307 (Conn. 1997)
(applying American Pipe tolling in Connecticut); Philip Morris USA, Inc. v. Christensen, 905 A.2d 340,
354-55 & n.8 (Md. 2006) (adopting American Pipe tolling in Maryland and listing eleven other states
that had done the same), abrogated on other grounds by Mummert v. Alizadeh, 77 A.3d 1049 (Md.
2013); Stevens v. Novartis Pharm. Corp., 247 P.3d 244, 251 (Mont. 2010) (adopting American Pipe
tolling in Montana). Of course, not every state permits class action tolling, nor is class action tolling
appropriate in every situation. Courts and commentators alike frequently repeat the precaution that the
American Pipe tolling rule "is a generous one, inviting abuse." See, e.g., Albano v. Shea Homes Ltd.,
634 F.3d 524, 529 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting Crown, Cork & Seal Co. v. Parker, 462 U.S. 345, 354 (1983)
(Powell, J., concurring)); Weston v. AmeriBank, 265 F.3d 366, 368 (6th Cir. 2001) (quoting Crown,
Cork & Seal Co., 462 U.S. at 354 (Powell, J., concurring)); Sellers v. Bragg, No. 04 C 3663, 2005 WL
1667406, at *6 (N.D. Ill. July 13, 2005) (quoting Crown, Cork & Seal Co., 462 U.S. at 354 (Powell, J.,
concurring)); Wasserman, supra note 4, at 828 (quoting Crown, Cork & Seal Co., 462 U.S. at 354
(Powell, J., concurring)).
228 2 RUBENSTEIN, supra note 38, § 9:66, at 608; see also Gerald D. Jowers, Jr., The Class Stops
the Clock, TRIAL, Nov. 2005, at 18, 22.
229 Adedje v. Westat, Inc., 75 A.3d 401, 413 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2013) (stating, nevertheless, that
those cases involved tolling one jurisdiction's statutes of limitations as opposed to tolling statutes of
limitations of two different jurisdictions).
230 See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d) (2012) (expanding federal jurisdiction over class actions significantly).
Congress passed CAFA in part to curb alleged abuses in certain state courts that approved class certifi-
cations too readily. See, e.g., United Steel Workers Int'l Union v. Shell Oil Co., 602 F.3d 1087, 1090
(9th Cir. 2010) (quoting Tanoh v. Dow Chem. Co., 561 F.3d 945, 952 (9th Cir. 2009)); Kevin M. Cler-
mont & Theodore Eisenberg, CAFA Judicata: A Tale of Waste and Politics, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 1553,
1554-55 (2008) (noting, among other things, that when President George W. Bush signed CAFA into
law, he stated CAFA was a "'step toward ending the lawsuit culture in our country,"' Remarks on Sign-
ing the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, 41 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DoC. 265, 265 (Feb. 18, 2005), but
that the "malady" requiring this "cure" was not "beyond debate"); Brooke D. Coleman, The Vanishing
Plaintiff 42 SETON HALL L. REV. 501, 509 (2012); Howard M. Erichson, CAFA's Impact on Class
Action Lawyers, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 1593, 1599-1600 (2008); Steven S. Gensler, The Other Side of the
CAFA Effect: An Empirical Analysis of Class Action Activity in the Oklahoma State Courts, 58 U. KAN.
L. REV. 809, 810 (2010); Jennifer J. Johnson, Securities Class Actions in State Court, 80 U. CIN. L. REV.
349, 356-58 (2011); Robert H. Klonoff & Mark Herrmann, The Class Action Fairness Act: An Ill-
Conceived Approach to Class Settlements, 80 TUL. L. REV. 1695, 1711-18 (2006); Suzette M. Mal-
veaux, Fighting to Keep Employment Discrimination Class Actions Alive: How Allison v. Citgo's Pre-
domination Requirement Threatens to Undermine Title VII Enforcement, 26 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB.
L. 405, 433 (2005); Steven M. Puiszis, Developing Trends with the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005,
40 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 115, 116 (2006); Georgene Vairo, What Goes Around, Comes Around: From
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tions in several state courts as well as in federal courts, and there was no
way to consolidate duplicative state and federal cases.2 3' CAFA, however,
loosened the requirement for federal court jurisdiction over nationwide
class actions by adopting a minimal diversity provision that requires plain-
tiffs to bring most of these cases in federal court or allows defendants to
remove them to federal court.2 3 2 Under this new provision, any alleged class
action could be filed in or removed to federal court so long as any member
of the class was a citizen of a different state than any defendant and other
prerequisites are met.233 Courts, however, face uncertainty in interpreting
the extent of CAFA's jurisdictional provisions-or how to interpret those
provisions-when a court declines to certify a class action filed or removed
to federal court solely based on CAFA's minimal diversity jurisdiction pro-
234
visions.
What is clear is that the increased federal jurisdiction over class ac-
tions provided by CAFA means more and more state-based class actions
will be litigated in federal courts, where it often takes years to reach class
certification decisions and where it has never been more difficult to certify
the Rector ofBarkway to Knowles, 32 REV. LITIG. 721, 768 (2013); Tobias Barrington Wolff, Preclu-
sion in Class Action Litigation, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 717, 746-47 (2005).
231 Bayer, 131 S. Ct. at 2376; Klonoff, supra note 22, at 743.
232 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332(d)(2), 1453; see also Tanya Pierce, It's Not Over 'Til It's Over: Mandating
Federal Pretrial Jurisdiction and Oversight in Mass Torts, 79 Mo. L. REV. 27, 38 (2014). See generally
Emery G. Lee & Thomas E. Willging, Defining the Problem of Cost in Federal Civil Litigation, 60
DUKE L.J. 765 (2010).
233 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2). Federal courts have jurisdiction of class actions under CAFA if "mini-
mal diversity" exists; the amount in controversy, which may be aggregated, exceeds $5,000,000; there
are at least 100 members in the class; and none of the statutory exceptions to federal jurisdiction apply.
Id, § 1332(d)(2)-(5). Minimal diversity exists when "any member of a class of plaintiffs is a citizen of a
State different from any defendant." Id. § 1332(d)(2)(A).
234 See, e.g., Michael P. Daly & Jessica D. Khan, We Got No Class and We Got No Principles:
CAFA and the Denial of Class Certification, WESTLAW J. CLASS ACTION, Oct. 2010, at 3, 3 ("[G]iven
that CAFA has been on the books for five years, one might . .. expect that the courts would have
reached a consensus" on the question of what effect a denial of certification "would have on jurisdiction
that was premised on the existence of a class," but "[o]ne would be wrong."); G. Shaun Richardson,
Class Dismissed, Now What? Exploring the Exercise of CAFA Jurisdiction After the Denial of a Class
Certification, 39 N.M. L. REV. 121, 125 (2009) ("[N]ot only is there a lack of consensus as to whether
denial of certification should result in dismissal, but there also is a marked disagreement as to how
courts should go about analyzing the question."); Lonny Sheinkopf Hoffman, Burdens of Jurisdictional
Proof 59 ALA. L. REV. 409, 411 (2008) (analyzing whether CAFA shifted the jurisdictional burden of
proof). Thus, while recently a growing number of circuits have taken the position that CAFA jurisdic-
tion continues even after a class certification is denied, the answer is far from certain. See Puerto Rico
Coll. of Dental Surgeons v. Triple S Mgmt. Inc., No. 09-1209 (JAF), 2013 WL 4806454, at *1 (D.P.R.
Sept. 6, 2013) (observing that while the First Circuit had not ruled on the issue, the Sixth, Seventh,
Eighth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits had all held that jurisdiction under CAFA continues despite a
denial of class certification).
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a class action.2 35 This combination of facts means cross-jurisdictional tolling
issues will likely only increase in frequency and importance.2 3 6
Meanwhile, jurisprudence on cross-jurisdictional tolling is just emerg-
ing, and the state of the law is "not yet thoroughly developed."23 7 As the
Montana Supreme Court in a case of first impression put it, "So called
'cross-jurisdictional tolling' has rarely been addressed, and the few state
courts and secondary sources to have considered the doctrine have ex-
pressed widely divergent viewpoints."2 3 8 Recently, courts in both Delaware
and Maryland also recognized that jurisdictions were divided on the is-
sue.23 9 Thus far, however, the majority of states that have considered cross-
jurisdictional tolling appear to have rejected it outright.2 40
235 See, e.g., Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2553, 2557 (2011) (rejecting class
certification under the commonality requirement of Rule 23(a)(2) where proposed class members did
not demonstrate that they had "suffered the same injury" and also holding "claims for back pay were
improperly certified" under Rule 23(b)(2)); Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 864-65 (1999)
(rejecting proposed limited-fund asbestos-settlement class action under Rule 23(b)(1)(B)); Amchem
Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 622-25 (1997) (rejecting attempt to certify proposed class of
present and future asbestos claimants under Rule 23(b)(3)); Klonoff, supra note 22, at 746 (analyzing,
among other things, "key areas in which federal courts have made class actions more difficult for plain-
tiffs to bring"); Tidmarsh, Living in CAFA s World, supra note 22, at 692-93; Vairo, supra note 22, at
513 ("After Amchem, it has been rare for a personal injury mass tort case to be certified."); Steven
Boranian, Statute of Limitations Undoes Class Action That Has No Legs Anyway, DRUG & DEVICE L.
BLOG (Mar. 7, 2014, 1:00 PM), http://druganddevicelaw.blogspot.com/2014/03/statute-of-limitations-
undoes-class.html (opining that "over the last 15 years," class actions involving drugs and medical
devices have become "all but uncertifiable outside of the settlement context").
236 Recently a growing number of circuits have taken the position that CAFA jurisdiction continues
even after a class certification is denied. See Puerto Rico Coll. ofDental Surgeons, 2013 WL 4806454,
at * 1. The answer to the continuing jurisdiction question, however, is not certain. Some courts take the
opposite view and dismiss or remand after a denial of class certification in cases in which federal juris-
diction depends on CAFA's minimal diversity jurisdiction provision. See, e.g., In re Motions to Certify
Classes Against Court Reporting Firms for Charges Relating to Word Indices, 715 F. Supp. 2d 1265,
1274, 1284 (S.D. Fla. 2010). In these cases, cross-jurisdictional tolling issues are even more likely to
arise because the plaintiffs will be forced to pursue recovery in state courts when federal courts conclude
they lack subject matter jurisdiction over the claims.
237 Quinn v. La. Citizens Prop. Ins. Corp., 118 So. 3d 1011, 1020 (La. 2012).
238 Stevens v. Novartis Pharm. Corp., 247 P.3d 244, 252 (Mont. 2010). Because cross-
jurisdictional tolling potentially implicates the laws of different jurisdictions, it is not surprising that
courts have reached different conclusions. And this Article does not mean to suggest that courts in all
jurisdictions should adopt the same rules regarding cross-jurisdictional tolling.
239 Dow Chem. Corp. v. Blanco, 67 A.3d 392, 397-98 n.32 (Del. 2013) (collecting cases showing
split); Adedje v. Westat, Inc., 75 A.3d 401, 412 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2012) ("'[T]he supreme courts of
states that recognize class action tolling have split on the issue of whether to adopt cross-jurisdictional
tolling."' (quoting Philip Morris USA, Inc. v. Christensen, 905 A.2d 340, 356 n.9 (Md. 2006))); accord
Quinn, 118 So. 3d at 1020-21 (also recognizing a split).
240 See, e.g., Vincent v. Money Store, 915 F. Supp. 2d 553, 561 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) ("The plaintiffs
cannot rely on American Pipe to toll the statutes of limitations for their state law claims. The plaintiffs
must look to any state analogue to American Pipe tolling rather than American Pipe itself."); Portwood
v. Ford Motor Co., 701 N.E.2d 1102, 1104 (Ill. 1998); Rolwing v. Nestle Holdings, Inc., 437 S.W.3d
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One troubling aspect of early cross-jurisdictional tolling cases is that
courts have tended to employ bright-line language similar to the bright-line
prohibitions articulated by certain circuit courts in the context of successive
class action tolling. For example, the Supreme Court of Tennessee has de-
clared broadly, "[W]e decline to adopt the doctrine of cross-jurisdictional
tolling in Tennessee. . . . Tennessee 'simply has no interest, except perhaps
out of comity, in furthering the efficiency and economy of the class action
procedures of another jurisdiction, whether those of the federal courts or
those of another state."'24 1 Likewise, the Fourth Circuit, predicting what the
Virginia Supreme Court would do, declared, "The Virginia Supreme Court
would not adopt a cross-jurisdictional equitable tolling rule."242 While fur-
ther study is needed to determine what approaches to cross-jurisdictional
may be preferable, the evolution of the law on successive class action toll-
ing, suggests that courts should, when possible, avoid articulating bright-
line prohibitions as they begin to consider this complicated issue.24 3 Avoid-
ing such rules will increase courts' ability to allow class action tolling under
appropriate circumstances and prohibit it in others.
CONCLUSION
Over time, class action practice has grown more complicated, both be-
cause of rapid expansions in the attempted uses of the class action device
and because of responses to the more adventurous of those attempts by
lawyers, courts, and legislatures. Whether filed in federal courts or in state
courts, it often takes years for courts to reach class certification decisions.
Because of that time lag, without the application of American Pipe tolling,
plaintiffs would have to intervene in or file their own lawsuits to protect
their claims in case a court were to deny certification of the alleged class
action. Forty years ago, the Supreme Court recognized this dilemma when
it adopted the American Pipe tolling rule. While federal courts have settled
the application of the American Pipe tolling rule in the typical scenario in-
180, 184 (Mo. 2014) (en banc) (rejecting cross-jurisdiction tolling by holding that a class action pending
in Ohio state court did not serve to toll limitations under Missouri law); Ravitch v. Pricewaterhouse, 793
A.2d 939, 945 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2002); Maestas v. Sofamor Danek Grp., 33 S.W.3d 805, 806 (Tenn.
2000); Bell v. Showa Denko K.K., 899 S.W.2d 749, 757-58 (Tex. App. 1995); Casey v. Merck & Co.,
722 S.E.2d 842, 845 (Va. 2012).
241 Maestas, 33 S.W.3d at 808 (quoting Wade v. Danek Medical, Inc., 182 F.3d 281, 287 (4th Cir.
1999)).
242 Wade, 182 F.3d at 287.
243 Of course, if the law in the applicable jurisdiction has rejected class action tolling, cross-
jurisdictional tolling cannot apply either. See, e.g., Quinn, 118 So. 3d at 1020 ("[T]he plain language of
La. C.C.P. art. 596 dictates that the suspension of prescription provided therein applies only to 'peti-
tion[s] brought on behalf of a class' in the state courts of Lousiana." (footnote omitted) (quoting LA.
CODE CIV. PROC. ANN. art. 596(A) (2010))).
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volving a later-filed individual claim, the application of the rule is more
complicated in other scenarios, and courts disagree as to its appropriate
outer limits. 2 4 4 These disagreements have caused considerable confusion
and uncertainty, bringing about significant litigation-related inefficiencies
for both plaintiffs and defendants and frustrating the goals of underlying
American Pipe tolling.
The successive subclass actions filed in the wake of the Wal-Mart
Stores v. Dukes decision dramatically illustrate the disparities that can result
when courts apply conflicting approaches to answer the same question,
especially when one of those approaches involves a bright-line prohibition.
The district courts there were faced with rules that conflicted-some of
which flatly rejected the possibility of tolling any successive class actions
and others that required it. Given the unique facts presented by the changed
definition of commonality that resulted in a late and unanticipated decertifi-
cation of plaintiffs' class action, the balance of law, equities, and efficien-
cies all weighed heavily in favor of tolling. But following precedent that
existed at the time, three of the district courts refused to toll limitations for
plaintiffs' later class allegations, and only one allowed tolling. In part be-
cause the law on successive class actions is evolving, after appeals were
taken, three of the successive subclass actions were considered timely, and
just one was time-barred. Like typical cases involving circuit splits, the
outcomes in each of the Wal-Mart successive classes depended on the geo-
graphic location in which the parties filed the cases. But unlike most typical
circuit split situations where different parties file different cases, the Wal-
Mart successive classes arose out of the same case. Thus, while typical cir-
cuit split situations involve distinguishing factors that help explain the dif-
ferent outcomes, in these cases arguably no such distinguishing factors ex-
isted.
Such results not only frustrate American Pipe tolling's goals of pro-
moting efficiency and economy and avoiding unfair surprise, they also
threaten to undermine the public's confidence that courts will predictably,
fairly, and transparently apply rules in other cases. In addition, in all cases,
there exists an "overriding judicial goal of deciding cases correctly, on the
basis of their legal and factual merits."245 But when courts reach mutually
exclusive answers to the same question arising from the same litigation, the
answers cannot all have been decided correctly.
For the reasons discussed in this Article, in the context of successive
class action tolling, courts should follow the satisfaction approach adopted
by the Sixth and Seventh Circuits and toll limitations when the claimants'
substantive claims are covered by the earlier alleged class actions. Each of
the approaches to successive class action litigation has its costs and bene-
fits. The application of first approach, which never allows tolling due to a
244 Stevens v. Novartis Pharm. Corp., 247 P.3d 244, 252 (Mont. 2010).
245 TCI Grp. Life Ins. Plan v. Knoebber, 244 F.3d 691, 695 (9th Cir. 2001).
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bright-line prohibition is straightforward in most cases. As illustrated by the
post-Wal-Mart subclass actions, however, this approach lacks flexibility to
respond in situations where successive class action tolling would be appro-
priate. And in those cases, the bright-line prohibition approach is also sub-
ject to criticism under Shady Grove and Bayer. Thus, the bright-line prohi-
bition approach is the least supportable of the three.
The limited exceptions approach is better as it allows courts to consid-
er fairness and apply American Pipe tolling only if doing so would further
the policies underlying such tolling. This approach also discourages plain-
tiffs from attempting to abuse the benefits of American Pipe tolling while
protecting plaintiffs who properly relied on a class action to protect their
interests. In light of the Supreme Court's decisions in Bayer and Shady
Grove, and the policy considerations underlying American Pipe tolling,
however, courts should adopt the satisfaction approach to successive class
action tolling. Under this approach, as long as the original class action is
timely filed, the applicable statutes of limitations are considered met. The
analysis, therefore, would be consistent with Bayer in that it would not re-
ject tolling based on an earlier denial of class certification. It would also be
consistent with Shady Grove because it focuses on the propriety of the later
alleged class under Rule 23, which Shady Grove suggests provides the de-
finitive answer to whether cases can proceed as class actions in federal
courts. In addition, because successive class action tolling will nearly al-
ways be allowed, the satisfaction approach is also the one least likely en-
courage plaintiffs to file protective class actions. This approach also pre-
vents protracted litigation about tolling and instead allows courts and liti-
gants to focus on the propriety of class certification.
Moving to the problem of cross-jurisdictional tolling, courts will likely
face this issue with increasing regularity. CAFA greatly increased federal
jurisdiction over class actions, meaning parties will often be required to
litigate state-based class actions in federal courts. Because courts often take
years to reach certification decisions, cross-jurisdictional tolling issues will
likely become more prevalent. As they do, courts that are faced with cross-
jurisdictional tolling issues would be well advised to avoid articulating un-
necessarily broad prohibitions while the law in this area develops.
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